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AN INVESTIGATION ON RISK ANALYSIS METHODS TO BE USED FOR 
THE PREVENTION OF MAJOR INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS 
 
SUMMARY 
Generally in the industry, there are a lot of industry’s types within the hazard class. 
One of the most hazardous types of industry is the Chemical Industry. If we do not 
eliminate dangers and do not take necessary measurements, the major industrial 
accidents can be occur with the deaths, injuries and economic losses. 
Major industrial accidents involving dangerous chemicals pose a significant threat to 
humans and the environment. However, the use of large amounts of dangerous 
chemicals is unavoidable in some industry sectors which are vital for a modern 
industrialised society. To minimise the associated risks, measures are necessary to 
prevent major accidents and to ensure appropriate preparedness and response should 
such accidents nevertheless happen. 
One of the major industrial accident was happened in Italian town of Seveso in 1976. 
An explosion occured in a TCP (2,4,5 – trichlorophenol) reactor of the ICMESA 
chemical plant. After the explosion, a toxic cloud containing TCDD (2,3,7,8 – 
tetrachlorodibenzo – p –dioxin) was accidentally released into the atmosphere. This 
event became internationally known as the Seveso disaster. In Europe, the catastropic 
accident prompted the adoption of legistation on the prevention and control of such 
accidents. The so-called Seveso-Direcitve (Directive 82/50/EEC) and was adopted in 
1982 by the  Europian Union (EU). The Seveso Directive aims at the prevention of 
major accidents involving dangerous substances. However, as accidents may 
neverless occur, it also aims at he limiting the consequences of such accidents not 
only for human health but also for the environment. SEVESO  was later amended in 
view of the lessons learned from later accidents such as Bhopal, Toulouse or 
Enschede resulting into Seveso-II (Directive 96/82/EC) in 1996. And also in 2003, 
Seveso II was revised proposal as Extended Seveso II (Directive 2003/105/EC). 
Application depends on inventory of dangerous substances, currently defined using 
CHIP( Chemicals Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply) regulations eg 
toxic, very toxic etc. But CHIP is on the way out and the CLP(Classification, 
Labelling and Packaking of Substances and Mixtures ) Regulations are on the way in 
and without the new Seveso III Directive, Seveso/COMAH would cease to funtion.  
Lastly, in 2012 Seveso-III (Directive 2012/18/EEC) was adopted  by EU and will 
come into force from 1
st
 January 2016. The main approach stays the same : 3 part 
strategy : identification; control; & mitigation.  Seveso III will have the same 
component parts: safety management of sites cabaple of producing major accident 
hazards, emergency planning, land use planning & inspection. It replaces the 
previous Seveso II directive. 
 
The main areas of change in the Seveso III Directive are:  
 Scope – how the system will move from CHIP classification to CLP – i.e. 
which substances are in/ out. 
 Public info – more requirements than in Seveso II. 
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 Inspection - kept the current approach of hazard/risk based inspections. 
 Correction system  - there is currently no legal method for taking substances 
out of scope the Seveso III Directive i.e. substances which come into scope of 
the CLP classification but are considered not to have major accident 
potential.  There is currently work going on in Europe to look at this but there 
is no easy solution as any change would require the Commission to put 
forward a proposal to amend the Directive. 
The Directive contains general and specific obligations on both the competent 
authorities of the member states and industrialists. One of the issues covered by 
Seveso Directive is to perform Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) for  the plants. 
Process Hazard Analysis is a set of organized  systematic assessments of the 
potential hazards associated  with an industrial process. There are varieties of 
methodologies that can be used to conduct a PHA and the most known methodology 
is the Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP).  A HAZOP is systematic approach to 
investigating each element of a process to identify all of the ways in which 
parameters can deviate from the indented design conditions and create hazards or 
operability problems. A HAZOP study typically involves using Piping and 
Instumental Diagrams (P&ID), or a plant model, as a guide for examining every 
section and component of aprocess.  
The Seveso II entered into force in Turkey in 30
th
 December 2013. In 1
st
 January 
2016, the Seveso II will dismantle and Seveso III will take place of Seveso II  in 
Europe. The main purpose of this study that contirbutes to great industrial plants 
which are located in Turkey, to pass from Seveso II to III and  exemplary the 
BOTAS (Petroleum Pipeline Corporation) Inc. plant was analyzed.  The hazards and 
potential risks were determined in BOTAS, and potential scenarios were written for 
plant and the event of  these scenarios, plant’s impact on ecosystem and environment 
are determined by computer programme. 
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BÜYÜK ENDÜSTRİYEL KAZALARIN ÖNLENMESİ İÇİN KULLANILAN 
RİSK ANALİZ YÖNTEMLERİ ÜZERİNE BİR İNCELEME 
 
ÖZET 
Genel olarak endüstri içinde :  bir çok tehlike sınıfına giren sanayi kolları vardır. Bu 
sanayi kollarının en tehlikesi ‘Kimya Endüstrisidir’. Var olan bu tehlikeleri ortadan 
kaldırmaz ve gerekli tedbirleri almazsak, ölümler, yaralanmalar ve yüksek ekonomik 
kayıplarla  ile sonuclanan büyük kazalar meydana gelmektedir. 
Büyük Endüstriyel Kazalar tanımı ile, herhangi bir işletmede, kontrolsüz 
gelişmelerden kaynaklanan ve tesis  içinde veya dışında insan sağlığı için anında 
veya sonrasında  ciddi tehlikelere yol açabilen, bir veya birden fazla tehlikeli 
maddenin sebep olduğu büyük yayılımları, yangınları veya patlamaları ifade 
etmektedir. 
Bu çalışmanın konusu olan Büyük Endüstriyel Kazalardan biri 10 temmuz 1976’da 
İtalyanın Lombardiya bölgesinin Seveso kasabasında küçük bir kimyasal üretim 
fabrikasında meydana gelmiştir. Triklorofenol (TCP) üretmek için diğer rakip 
şirketlere göre daha tehlikeli bir reaksiyon kullanılması  ve reaktörün yeterince 
soğutulmadan bırakılmasına olanak sağlayan tehlikeli işletim uygulamaları bu 
önemli kazanın oluşma nedenleridir. Ekzotermik bir kimyasal reaksiyonun 
kontrolünün kaybedilmesi, patlama diskinde ve basınç tahliye sisteminde reaktörün 
içeriğinin atmosfere  salınmasına  yol açmıştır. Toksik ve korozif kimyasallardan 
oluşan, fenol, sodyum hidroksit ve 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioksin (TCDD – 
‘Seveso Dioksin’) içeren bir gaz bulutu çevreye  yayılmıştır. Bu zehirli gaz, bu güne 
kadar bilinen en zehirli gazlardan dioksindir. Kasabada kısa bir süre içinde hayvan 
ölümleri görülmeye başlanmış, patlamadan 5 gün geçtikten sonra da hastaneye 
başvurular başlamıştır. Yapılan kontroller sonunda kasabada geniş bir bölgenin 
tamamen  kirlendiği anlaşılmış ve 100 kadar ev tamamne boşaltılmışdır.   
Dioksin (TCDD) besin zincirine katılan ve etkileri uzun yıllar devam eden tehlike 
sınıfı yüksek bir kimyasal olduğu için o bölgede halen tarım faaliyeti 
yapılmamaktadır. 
Seveso felaketinden sonra Avrupa ülkelerinde endüstriyel kazalara karşı mevcut 
önlemlerin yetersiz olduğu sonucuna  varılarak bir dizi çalışma başlatıldı. O zamanki 
adıyla Avrupa Topluluğu Konseyi (EC), yapılan çalışmalar sonucunda tehlikeli 
maddelerle ilgili büyük endüstriyel kazaların kontrolü ve önlenmesi ile ilgili ‘Seveso 
Yönergesi (Direktifi)’ni 24 Haziran 1982 tarihinde yayınladı. 
 Ancak SEVESO Direktifi sonrasında da 1984 Bhopal felaketi başta olmak üzere 
gerek dünyada gerek Avrupa’da devam eden Büyük Endüstriyel Kazalar sonrasında, 
bu direktifin etkinliğinin artırılması ve kapsamının genişletilmesi amacıyla 1996 
yılında 96/82/EC SEVESO II Direktifi yayınlanmış, 2003 yılın da bir kez daha 
gözden geçirilerek 2003/105/EC ‘Genişletilmiş Seveso II Direktifi’ olarak revize 
edilmiştir. Son olarak da 2012/18/EEC sayılı SEVESO III Direktifi, 26 Haziran 2012 
tarihinde AB Bakanlar Konseyi’nde kabul edilmiştir. Yeni direktif 1 Ocak 2016 
tarihinde yürürlüğe girecektir. Direktifin ana hatları aşağıdakı gibidir :  
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 Direktif’te detaylı şekilde tanımlanan  görevlerin yerine getirlmesi için bir 
yetkili otoritenin belirlenmesi 
 Kazaların domino etkileri 
 Arazi Kullanım Planlaması, çevre etkileri 
 Risk Değerlendirme Metodolojisi ve Kaza Senaryoları, tatbikatlar 
 Kamu Bilgilendirilmesi 
 Büyük Endüstriyel Kazalar sırasında uygulanacak dahili ve harici Acil Durum 
Planlarının (ADP) hazırlanması, gözden geçirlimesi, test edilmesi ve revize 
edilmesi. 
 Büyük endüstriyel kazaların araştırılması, raporlanması ve denetimi 
 Kimyasalların sınıflandırılması, paketlenmesi ve etiketlenmesi 
Direktif hem sanayiciler üzerindeki hem de üye devletlerin yetkili makamları 
üzerinde genel ve özel yükümlükleri içerir. İşletmeci, büyük kazaları ve büyük bir 
kazanın meydana gelmesi durumunda, bunların etkilerini çevre ve insanlara en az 
zarar vercek şekilde sınırlamak için gerekli tüm tedbirleri almakla yükümlüdür.  
Direktifin kapsadığı konulardan biride, tesis için Proses Tehlike Analizinin 
yapılmasıdır. Bir endüstriyel süreçle ilgili potansiyel tehlikelerin değerlendirlmesinin 
organize ve sistematik bir set oluşturarak yapılmasına ‘Proses Tehlike Analizi’ 
denilmektedir. Proses tehlike analizi gerçekleştirmek için çok çeşitli yöntemler olup, 
bunlardan en bilineni HAZOP’tur. Tehlike ve İşletilebilirlik Çalışması şeklinde 
bilinen HAZOP, özellikle kimsayal, ilaç ve petrokimya sektörlerinde en fazla 
kullanılan metoddur. HAZOP çalışması sonucunda eksik yada gerekli Proses 
Emniyet Bilgileri (Process Safety Information – PSI) ve ayrıca tüm proses tehlikeleri 
belirleniyor. PSI verileri normal operasyonlardan sapmaların sonuçlarını 
değerlendirmek için kullanılır. Sonuçlar değerlendirildikten sonra işletme (tesis) için 
risk derecendirilmesi yapılarak olasılıkların izin verilen seviyelere indirilmesi 
amacıyla güvenlik bariyerlerine ihtiyaç duyulup duyulmacağına karar verilir ve 
ayrıca sonuçlar bilgisayar program ile ayrıca değerlendirilir. 
Seveso – II Direktifinin Türkiye mevzuatına uyumlaştıran ‘Büyük Endüstryiyel 
Kazaların Önlenmesi ve Etkilerinin Azaltılması Hakkında Yönetmelik’ Çevre ve 
Şehircilik Bakanlığı ve Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik bakanlığınca oluşturulan bir 
komisyon ile hazırlanarak, 30 Aralık 2013 tarih ve 288867 Mükerrer sayılı Resmi 
Gazete’de yayımlanarak yürürlüğe girmiştir. 
Mevzuata göre Seveso Kapsamında yapılması gerekenler :  
 
 Büyük Kaza Önleme Politika Belgesi (BKÖP) 
 Güvenlik Raporu 
 Kantitatif Risk Değerlendirmesinin Yapılması (QRA) 
 Mümkün Olan En Yüksek Önlem Seviyesi 
 Güvenlik Yönetim Sistemi Kurulması 
 Dahili Acil Durum Planı 
 Harici Acil Durum Planı 
 Denetimler  
 
Belirtildiği gibi Türkiye’de SEVESO II direktifi 30 Aralık 2013 yılında yürürlüğe 
girmiştir. 1 Ocak 2016 tarihinde SEVESO II AB’de yürürlükten kaldırılacak ve 
yerini SEVESO III alacak. Bu çalışmanın ana amacı Türkiyede bulunan önemli 
endüstriyel tesislerin SEVESO II den SEVESO III geçmesinde katkıda bulunmak, ve 
örnekleme için  BOTAŞ (Boru Hatları ile Petrol Taşıma) A.Ş. tesisi incelenmiştir. 
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Yaşanmış büyük petrol yayılımları, yangınları ve patlamaları örnekler ile verilirken, 
dünya çapında geçerliliği olan yönetmelikler baz alınarak, yaşanmış tüm bu olayların 
bir daha yaşanmaması için ve olası risklerin önlenmesi için bu çalışma yapılmıştır. 
Tesisde bulunan eksikler belirlenmiş,  kantitatif risk değerlendirmesine göre 
belirlenen kritik ve tehlikeli ekipmanlar ve olası risklere uygun senaryolar yazılmış 
ve bu senaryoların gerçekleşmesi durumunda tesisin görebileceği zararları ve 
ekosisteme olacak etkileri yazılım programı ile belirlenmiştir.  
Elde edilen modellemeler aşağıdakı gibidir : 
 
 Yayılım Modeli (Release) 
 Atmosferik Dağılım Modeli 
 Pool/Havuz Evaporasyon Modeli 
 Termal Radyasyon / Yanma Modeli 
 Patlama Modeli 
 Kombine Modellemeler
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The development of process and design of chemical plant for the conversion of raw 
material into final products come under chemical enginnering. Process risk analysis 
is an important activity, which is to be performed at different life stages of process 
not only to meet the standarts/regulations but also for the improvement of the process 
and/or plant.  
Incidents and accidents especially the well known catastrophic accidents in 
Flixborugh (UK) , Seveso (Italy) and Bhopal (India) have shown that effects of 
process/plant malfuntion may not only be hazardous to operators but also 
catastrophic to human life (including members of public), environment and/or 
capital. Therefore, removing  process/plant malfunctions for reduction of risk and 
prevention of such accidents in future is of interest for community and company and 
an  emerging subject of chemical engineering as well[1]. 
Several directives in the Euopean community, e.g. EC Directive of Major Accident 
Hazards [2] and Atex Directives 137 (1999/92/EC) and 100A (84/9/EC /3/ for safety 
and health protection of workers from explosive atmospheres, are based on 
safety/risk analysis techniques. 
However, basic factors determining the magnitude of hazard (1-3) and risk(1-9) are:  
1. inventory and properties of hazardous materials (volatility, toxicity, 
reactivity) 
2. type of operation; process conditions 
3. complexity of operations 
4. design and operation relative to standards and codes 
5. layout of equipment  
6. plant layout (distance of equipment) 
7. preventive and protective measures 
8. plant site (distance to population centers, vulnerability of the surrounding) 
9. effectiveness of plant management (operator training, production vs.risk) 
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To come from hazardous process (idea) to safe operation (safe operation means the 
risk is small enough to be tolerated by community and company) safety/risk analysis 
work is relevant during process development, plant design and  plant operation as 
well. In addition to safety/risk analysis techniques, inherent safety design practices 
are also used in order to improve the process, technology and management[3]. 
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2. RISK TERMINOLOGY 
2.1 What is the Hazard ? 
Hazard is a physical situation with a potential for human injury,damage to property, 
damage to the environment or some combination of these or we can say a hazard is 
acombination of a hazardous material, an operating environment, and certain 
unplanned events that could results in a accident. The degree of hazard depends on 
inventory and properties of hazardous materials (volalitility, toxicity, reactivity) type 
of operation and process conditions[4]. 
2.2 What is the Risk ? 
Risk describes the frequnecy and magnitude of damage e.g. financial risk may be 
expressed as a product of frequency and damage costs (Risk = frequency x 
consequency). 
2.3 What is the Risk Calculation? 
Risk calculation has to consider the objective, which may be focused on an 
individual (operator or public at fence ) , society or company.  Invidual risk may be 
raleted  to financial, injury or death. Societal risk may include number of injuries or 
deaths, contimination of the environment and/or property damage. Company  
interests may be related to economical aspects and/or loss of production/market. 
2.4 Inherent Safety Measure  
Inherent safety measures may be classified in material/chemical, process or 
construction effects. Reducing inventories of hazardous materials, or – if possible – 
replacing them by less hazardous chemicals is the preferred inherent safety measure. 
Next, a less hazardous process, reduction of process parameters (temperature, 
pressure) will increase inherent safety as well. A simplified construciton and design 
related to maximum pressure possible, e.g as s result of run away reactions, 
characterize  the third class[5].  
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2.5 Hazard Assessment 
Hazard assessment ends with evaulating various amounts of emissions of hazardous 
(flammable, toxic) chemicals. 
2.6 Safety/Risk Analysis 
Safety/risk analysis is a qualitative/quantitative estimate of risk based on damage and 
frequency analysis of relevant harmful events. 
2.7 Risk Assessment 
Risk assessmnet underlines the point that the study ends with the assessment of 
resulting consequences in terms of fatalities and/or damage loss. 
2.8 Frequency 
Frequency is the number that event (failure or damage) occurs per time. 
2.9 Probability 
Probability describes the likelihood that event will succeed or not. The probability 
number is between 1 and 0 and has no unit. 
2.10 Failure 
Failure  is when a system is incapable of carrying out its duty. Systems can fail either 
to a dangereous condition or to a safe condition. Revealed failure will be detected at 
the time of failure exist. Unrevealed failure will remain undetected until to the time 
of routinely proof test. 
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3. RISK MANAGEMENT 
The sound management of chemicals throughout their life-cycle is an essential 
national activity in order to minimise risk, and/or prevent the occurrence of adverse 
impacts. The function of risk management is to decide whether a level of risk is 
acceptable, and if not, to translate the information into policies and actions designed 
to, for example, control exposure, to reduce risk through national legislative action, 
or to reduce risk in a variety of other ways[6]. 
Human health and environmental risks can occur at any, or all of the stages of a 
commercial chemical life-cycle, which may consist of: 
 extracting and  refining industries; 
 chemical manufacturers and processors; 
 chemical formulators; 
 individual customers; and 
 chemical disposers. 
3.1 What is Risk Management ? 
The risks associated with a potential for harm due to exposure to chemicals have to 
be identified, assessed and managed appropriately. The distinction between 
assessment and management of risks is a key issue. Much has been written on the 
purpose and implementation of the risk assessment procedure, which is designed to 
evaluate, usually quantitatively, the nature and magnitude of a potential risk. But on 
its own, risk assessment has limited value[6]. 
Risk management on the other hand, is the decision-making process to accept a 
known or assessed risk and/or the implementation of actions to reduce the 
consequences or probabilities of such an occurrence. Various definitions of risk 
management have been developed by national organisations and institutions. 
According to the United States Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk 
Assessment and Risk Management (1997), risk management ‘is the process of 
identifying, evaluating, selecting, and implementing actions to reduce risk to human 
health and to ecosystems. The goal of risk management is scientifically sound, cost-
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effective, integrated actions that reduce or prevent risks, while taking into account 
social, cultural, ethical, political, and legal considerations.’ 
When developing risk management decision-making strategies, two complementary 
approaches are considered, usually in sequence: 
 effects – oriented policies : effects on human health ant the environment; and 
 source – oriented policies: prevention of effects by controlling releases. 
The effects of a chemical on health and the environment via an exposure pathway, 
for example, represents the first important parameter. Then suitable exposure 
standards can be developed. These standards are then translated into a source-related 
policy to control the releases of the chemical to ensure that exposure standards are 
not exceeded. Risk management therefore considers both policies. 
In more general terms, risk management decision-making should embody a 
systematic, and structured approach to chemical risks, that allows the parties 
involved to: 
 identify risks/problems that need to eliminated or reduced – to evaluate; 
 identify ways in which these risks can be eliminated or,’managed’ – to 
control; and; 
 decide upon the most appropriate strategy to achieve reduction of risk – to 
implement and monitor. 
The risk management process can also be described as comprising a six-step process, 
ranging from identification of the problem to evaluation of control actions. The 
process is an iterative one and not a linear sequence of actions. The six steps have 
been recognised as an important cyclical process to follow so that governments can 
make informed decisions on priority chemicals. Conducting a situation 
analysis/needs assessment. 
1. Developing the risk reduciton goal,sub-goals and indicators 
2. Identifying and evaluating possible risk reduction options 
3. Obtaining commitment from decisin-makers and taking action  
4. Evaluating Impact 
As health and environmental problems caused by chemicals can sometimes be 
extremely complex to solve, experience from many countries shows that a well-
organised risk management decision-making process, such as is outlined here, can 
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assist in problem identification and taking appropriate action. This complexity is 
caused by a combination of factors: 
 The large of chemical subsances is commerce and substances of natural origin 
with which human beings come into contact, along with pollutants, 
contaminants in food, commercial and househol products; 
 Limited aviability of information concerning chemical use; many countries 
have insufficient data on the import, manufacture, trade, storage, transport, 
use and disposal of chemicals and chemical products; 
 A high level of uncertainty concerning the precise hazardous nature and 
impact of chemicals, by themselves or in combination with order substances, 
on human health and the environment; and 
 Divergent views amongst stakeholders, including public authorities, industry, 
consumers, trade unions, environmental groups, etc. with regard to the 
seriousness of the risks presented by chemicals , and on the appropriate 
responses[6].  
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4. RISK ASSESSMENT  
Risk assesssment and risk analysis of technical systems can be defined as a set of 
systematic methods to identify hazards, quantity risks and determining of 
components, safety measures and/or human interventions for plant safety. Ideally 
risk analysis should done by bringing together experts with different backgrounds 
which are chemicals, human errors and process equipments[7]. 
4.1 Risk Assessment Steps  
The scheme for qualitative and quantitative assessments: 
 
Figure  4.1 : Risk assesment steps. 
 
At all steps, above table, risk reducing measures need to be considered. 
4.2 Process Hazard Analysis 
Prosess hazard analysis (PHA) is a semi-quantitative analysis that is performed to: 
1. Identify all potential hazards and accidental events that may lead to an 
accident. 
2. Rank the identified accidental events according to their severity. 
3. Identify required hazard controls and follow up actions. 
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Several variants of PHA are used,  and sometimes under different names like rapid 
risk ranking and hazard identification (HAZID)[8]. 
PHA can be used for : 
 As an initial risk study in early stage of a project (e.g., of a new plant). 
Accicents are mainly caused by release of energy. The PHA identifies where 
energy may be released and which accidental events that may occur, and 
gives a rough estimate of the severity of each accidental event.The PHA 
results are used to (i) compare main concepts, to (ii) focus on important risk 
issues, and as (iii) input to more detailed risk anlyses.  
 As an initial step of a detailed risk anlysis of a system concept or an existing 
system. Th purpose of the PHA is then to identify those accidental events that 
should be subject to a further, and more detailed risk analysis. 
 As a complete risk analysis of a rather simple system. Whether or not a PHA 
will be a sufficient analysis depends both on the complexity of the system and 
the objectives of the analysis. 
The PHA  also shall consider about hazardous components, safety related 
interfaces between various system elements, environmental constraints including 
operating environments,operating, test maintanence, built-in-tests, diagnostics 
and emergency procedures,safety related equipments, safeguards, and possible 
alternate approaches. 
Mainly, the PHA procedure is consist of four step. 
1) PHA prerequisties is started with establish of PHA team and then system 
boundaries, process flow diagrams, block diagrams, use and storage of energy 
and hazardous materials in the sytem are defined and described. Risk 
information from previous and similar systems are also collected. A typical 
PHA tema may consist of a team leader, a secretary who will report the 
results and team members (2-6 persons) who can provide necessry knowledge 
and experience on the system being analyzed[8]. 
As part of the system familiarization it is important to consider : 
 What is the system dependent upon ? 
 What activities are performed by the system ? 
 What services does the system provide ? 
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2) Hazard identification – All hazards and possible accidental events must be 
identified. It is important to consider all parts of the system, operational 
modes, maintanence operations, safety systems, and so on. All findings shall 
be recorded. No hazards are too insignificant to be recorded. Common 
soureces of hazards can be calssified as : 
 Sources and propagation paths of stored energy in electrcalical, 
chemical or mechanical form 
 Mechanical moving parts 
 Material or system incompalities 
 Nuclear and electromagnetic radiation 
 Collisions and subsequent problems of survival and escape 
 Fire and explosion 
 Toxic and corrosive liquids and gases escaping from containers or 
being generated as a result of other incidents 
 Biological hazards, including bacterial growth in such places as fuel 
tanks 
 Human error in operating, handling or moving near equipment of the 
system 
 Software error that can be cuse accidents 
3) Frequency and consequence estimation – The risk related to an accidental 
event is function of the frequency of the event and the severity of its potential 
consequences. To determine the risk, we have to estimate the frequency and 
the severity of each accidental event. An accidental event may lead to wide 
range of consequences, ranging from negligible to catastrophic. A fire may, 
for example, be extenguished very fast and give minor consequneces, or lead 
to a disaster. In some applications the severity of an average consequence of 
an accidental event is assesed[8]. 
Severity classes – the severity of an event may be classified into rather broad 
classes. An example of such a classificaiton is shown in Figure 4.2 and also 
frequnecy classification is shown in Figure 4.3. 
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Figure  4.2 : The severity classes. 
 
Figure  4.3 : The frequency classes. 
4) Risk ranking and follow-up actions  - The risk is established as a combination 
of a given event/consequence and a severity of the same event/consequence. 
This will enable a ranking of the events/consequences in a risk matrix as 
illustrated below :  
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Figure  4.4 : Risk ranking and follow-up actions. 
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5. METHODS FOR HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
The selection of a PHA (Process Hazard Analysis) method depends on many 
factors including the size and complexity of the process and existing knowledge 
of the process[9]. 
One or more of the following methodologies as appropriate are used to determine 
and evaluate the hazards of the process being analyzed :  
 What If 
 Checklist  
 What – If/Checklist 
 Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) 
 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
 Fault Tree Analysis 
 An appropriate equivalent 
5.1 What –If Analysis 
     The purpose of a what-if analysis is to identify hazards, hazardous situations, or 
specific accident events that could produce an undesirable consequence. What-if 
analysis involves the examination of possible deviations from the design, 
construction, modification, or operating intent of a process. It can be used to examine 
virtually any aspect of facility design or operation. Because it is so flexible, it can be 
performed at any stage in the life of a process using whatever process information 
and knowledge is available[9]. 
5.1.1 Description of the method 
The what-if analysis is a creative, brainstorming examination of a process or 
operation conducted by a group of experienced individuals able to ask questions or 
voice concerns about undesired events. It is not as inherently structured as some 
other methods, such as the hazard and operability (HAZOP) study or a failure mode 
and effects analysis (FMEA). Rather, it requires the analysts to adapt the basic 
concept to the specific application. 
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The what-if analysis encourages a PrHA team to think of questions that begin with 
"What-if." Through this questioning process, an experienced group of individuals 
identify possible accident events, their consequences, and existing safety levels, then 
suggest alternatives for risk reduction. The potential accidents identified are neither 
ranked nor given quantitative implications. 
The what-if analysis method may simply generate a list of questions and answers 
about the process. However, it usually results in a tabular listing of hazardous 
situations, their consequences, safety levels, and possible options for risk reduction. 
5.1.2 Analysis procedure  
The information needed for a what-if analysis includes process descriptions, 
operating parameters, drawings, and operating procedures. All information must be 
available to the PrHA team, if possible, in advance of the team meetings. For 
analysis of an existing plant, the PrHA team may want to interview personnel 
responsible for operations, maintenance, utilities, or other services, if they are not on 
the PrHA team. In addition, if the analysis is performed offsite, the PrHA team 
should walk through the facility to better understand its layout, construction, and 
operation. Thus, visits and interviews should be scheduled before the analysis begins. 
Finally, some preliminary what-if questions should be prepared to "seed" the team 
meetings. If the analysis is an update of a previous PrHA, then questions listed in 
previous reports can be used. For a new process or a first-time application, 
preliminary questions should be developed by team members before the meetings, 
although additional questions formulated during the meetings are essential. The 
cause-and-effect thought process used in other types of analyses described in this 
section, such as HAZOP studies and FMEAs, can help formulate questions. 
5.1.3 Limitations of the method  
The what-if analysis is a powerful PrHA method if the analysis team is experienced 
and well organized. Otherwise, because it is a relatively unstructured approach, the 
results are likely to be incomplete[9][10]. 
5.2 Checklist Analysis 
The checklist analysis method is versatile, easy to use and can be applied at any stage 
in the life of a process. It is primarily used to indicate compliance with standards and 
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practices. It is also a cost-effective way to identify common and customarily 
recognized hazards. Checklists also provide a common basis for management review 
of assessments. Many organizations use standard checklists to control the 
development of a process or an entire project from initial design through 
decommissioning. The completed checklist must be approved by all relevant staff 
members and managers before a project can move from one stage to the next. 
5.2.1 Description of the method  
A checklist analysis uses a written list of items or procedures to verify the status of a 
system. Checklists may vary widely in level of detail, depending on the process 
being analyzed. A traditional checklist analysis uses a list of specific items to 
identify known types of hazards, design deficiencies, and potential accident scenarios 
associated with common process equipment and operations. The method can be used 
to evaluate materials, equipment, or procedures. Checklists are most often used to 
evaluate a specific design with which a company or industry has a significant amount 
of experience, but they can also be used at earlier stages of development for entirely 
new processes to identify and eliminate hazards that have been recognized through 
operation and evaluation of similar systems. To be most useful, checklists should be 
tailored specifically for an individual facility, process, or product. 
5.2.2 Analysis procedure 
Performing a checklist analysis requires access to engineering design procedures and 
operating practices manuals and must be performed by a team with appropriate 
expertise. An experienced manager or staff engineer should review the results and 
direct follow-up actions. 
A checklist is developed so that aspects of process design or operation that do not 
comply with standard industrial practices are discovered through responses to the 
questions in the list. A detailed checklist can be as extensive as necessary to satisfy 
the specific situation, but it should be applied conscientiously in order to identify 
problems that require further attention. Detailed checklists for particular processes 
should be augmented by generic checklists to help assure thoroughness. Generic 
checklists are often combined with other methods to evaluate hazardous situations. 
Checklists are limited by their authors' experience. They should be developed by 
individuals who have extensive experience with the processes they are analyzing. 
18 
 
Frequently, checklists are created simply by organizing information from current 
relevant codes, standards, and regulations. Checklists should be viewed as living 
documents and should be reviewed regularly and updated as required. 
5.2.3 Limitations of method 
When derived from handbooks or similar sources, many entries in a checklist may 
not be applicable to the process being studied. In other cases, process hazards may be 
so unusual they are not in standard checklists. Thus, it may be difficult to assure that 
all hazards have been analyzed. Also, checklists may indicate that hazards exist, but 
not what accident scenarios are associated with them[11]. 
5.3 What –If/Checklist Analysis 
The purpose of a what-if/checklist anlysis is to identify hazards, consider the types of 
accidents that can occur in a process or activity, evaluate in a qualitative manner the 
consequences of these accidents, and determine whether the safety levels against 
these potential accident scenarios appear adequate.  
5.3.1 Description of the method 
The what-if/checklist analysis method combines the creative, brainstorming features 
of the what-if analysis with the systematic features of the checklist analysis. The 
PrHA team uses the what-if analysis method to brainstorm the types of accidents that 
can occur within a process. Then the team uses one or more checklists to help fill in 
any gaps. Finally, the team members suggest ways for reducing the risk of operating 
the process. The what-if analysis encourages the PrHA team to consider potential 
accident events and consequences that are beyond the experience of the authors of a 
good checklist and, thus, are not covered on the checklist. Conversely, the checklist 
lends a systematic nature to the what-if analysis. 
Normally, a what-if/checklist analysis is used to examine the potential consequences 
of accident scenarios at a more general level than some of the more detailed PrHA 
methods. It can be used for any type of process at virtually any stage in its life cycle. 
However, this method is generally used to analyze the more common hazards that 
exist in a process. 
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5.3.2 Analysis procedure 
For a what-if/checklist analysis, the PrHA team leader assembles a qualified team 
and, if the process is large, divides it into functions, physical areas, or tasks to 
provide some order to the review. For the checklist portion of the analysis, the PrHA 
team leader obtains or develops an appropriate checklist for the team to use. This list 
need not be as detailed as those used for a standard checklist analysis. Rather than 
focusing on a specific list of design or operating features, the checklist used here 
should focus on general hazardous characteristics of the process. In what-if analysis 
section, the PrHA team uses to develop questions about potential accident scenarios. 
After the team members have identified all of the questions in a particular area or 
step of the process, they apply the previously-obtained or prepared checklist. The 
team considers each checklist item to determine whether any other potential accident 
scenarios exist. If so, these scenarios are added to the what-if list and evaluated in the 
same way. The checklist is reviewed for each area or step in the process. After 
developing questions involving potential accident scenarios, the PrHA team 
considers each one; qualitatively determines the possible effects of the potential 
accident; and lists existing safety levels to prevent, mitigate, or contain the effects of 
the accident. The team then evaluates the significance of each accident and 
determines whether a safety improvement should be recommended. This process is 
repeated for each area or step of the process or activity. The evaluation may be 
performed by specific team members outside the team meeting but must be 
subsequently reviewed by the team. 
5.3.3 Limitations of the method 
Combining the what-if and checklist analysis methods emphasizes their main 
positive features (i.e., the creativity of what-if analysis and the experience-based 
thoroughness of a checklist analysis) while at the same time compensating for their 
shortcomings when used separately. For example, a traditional checklist is, by 
definition, based on the process experience the author accumulates from various 
sources. The checklist is likely to provide incomplete insights into the design, 
procedural, and operating features necessary for a safe process. The what-if part of 
the analysis uses a team's creativity and experience to brainstorm potential accident 
scenarios. However, because the what-if analysis method is usually not as detailed, 
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systematic, or thorough as some of the more regimented approaches (e.g., HAZOP 
study, FMEA), use of a checklist permits the PrHA team to fill in any gaps in their 
thought process[10][11]. 
5.4 Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) 
The HAZOP study was developed to identify hazards in process plants and to 
identify operability problems that, although not hazardous, could compromise a 
plant's productivity. The basic concept behind HAZOP studies is that processes work 
well when operating under design conditions. When deviations from the process 
design conditions occur, operability problems and accidents can occur. The HAZOP 
study method uses guide words to assist the analysis team in considering the causes 
and consequences of deviations. These guide words are applied at specific points or 
sections in a process and are combined with specific process parameters to identify 
potential deviations from intended operation. 
5.4.1 Description of the method 
A HAZOP study requires considerable knowledge of the process, its instrumentation, 
and its operation. This information is usually provided by expert team members. The 
team should include individuals with a variety of experience, including design, 
engineering, operations, and maintenance[12]. 
The primary advantages of a HAZOP study are creativity and new ideas. Creativity 
is the result of interactions among team members with diverse backgrounds. Such 
interactions often generate new ideas. The success of a HAZOP study depends on the 
freedom of members to freely express their views. Combining this approach with a 
systematic protocol for examining hazards promotes thoroughness and accuracy. 
5.4.2 Analysis procedure   
A HAZOP study has three steps: (1) defining the process, (2) performing the study, 
and (3) documenting the results. Defining the process and documenting the results 
can be performed by a single person. The study itself must be performed by a team. 
DEFINING THE PROCESS TO BE STUDIED. This step identifies the specific vessels, 
equipment, and instrumentation to be included in the HAZOP study and the 
conditions under which they are analyzed. Defining the problem involves defining 
the boundaries of the analysis and establishing an appropriate level of resolution for 
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the study. For most HAZOP studies, the causes of deviations are identified at the 
component level. 
PERFORMING THE STUDY. A HAZOP study focuses on specific points of a process 
called "study nodes," process sections, or operating steps. Depending on the 
experience of the study leader, the portion of a process included in a single study 
node can vary. In the most conservative studies, every line and vessel are considered 
separately. If the HAZOP study leader is experienced, he or she may elect to 
combine two or more lines into a single study node. If too much of a process is 
included in a single study node, deviations may be missed. If too little of a process is 
included, the study can become tedious. In addition, root causes of deviations and 
their potential consequences can become separated. Too many study nodes is 
common for novice HAZOP study leaders. On the positive side, a study with too 
many nodes is less likely to miss scenarios than one with too few nodes[12]. 
DOCUMENTING THE RESULTS. The documentation of a HAZOP study is a systematic 
and consistent  tabulation of the effects of process deviations. The study generates 
narratives about the normal operating conditions and analysis boundary conditions 
for each equipment item. In addition, it provides a list of potential actions that should 
be evaluated. 
5.4.3 Limitations of the hazard and operability study 
The primary limitation of a HAZOP study is the length of time required to perform 
it. Because the study is designed to provide a complete analysis, study sessions can 
be intensive and tiring. HAZOP studies typically do not look at occupational hazards 
(e.g., electrical equipment, rotating equipment, hot surfaces) or chronic hazards (e.g., 
chronic chemical exposure, noise, heat stress). 
5.5 Failure Mode and Operability Analysis 
5.5.1 Description of the method 
A FMEA is used to examine each potential failure mode of a process to determine 
the effects of the failure on the system. A failure mode is the symptom, condition, or 
fashion in which hardware fails. It may be identified as a loss of function, a 
premature function (function without demand), an out-of-tolerance condition, or a 
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physical characteristic, such as a leak, observed during inspection. The effect of a 
failure mode is determined by the system's response to the failure[13]. 
5.5.2 Analysis procedure 
A FMEA has three steps: (1) defining the process, (2) performing the analysis, and 
(3) documenting the results. Defining the process for study and documenting the 
results can be performed by a single person. The analysis itself must be performed by 
a team[13]. 
5.5.3 Defining the process 
This step identifies the specific vessels, equipment, and instrumentation to be 
included in the FMEA and the conditions under which they are analyzed. Defining 
the problem involves establishing an appropriate level of resolution for the study and 
defining the boundary conditions for the analysis. 
The required level of resolution determines the extent of detail needed in a FMEA. 
The choices for the level of resolution range from the subcomponent level to the 
system level. To satisfy PSM Rule requirements, most FMEAs should be performed 
at the major component level. This level provides the best trade-off between the time 
necessary to perform the analysis and the usefulness of the information gained from 
it. 
Defining the analysis boundary conditions requires the following. 
 Identifying the system or process to be analyzed. 
 Establishing the physical boundaries of the systme or process. 
 Establishing the analytical boundaries of the system or process. 
 Documenting the internal and interface functions. 
 Documenting the expected performance of the system, process, or equipment 
item; the system or process restraints; and the failure definitions of the 
equipment items, the process, or the system. 
 Collecting up-to-date information identifying the process equipment and its 
functional relationship to the system  
Functional narratives about the system or process should include descriptions of the 
expected behavior of the system or process and the equipment components for each 
operational mode. Narratives should describe the operational profiles of the 
components and the functions and outputs of each. 
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PERFORMING THE ANALYSIS. The FMEA should be performed in a deliberate, 
systematic manner to reduce the possibility of omissions and to enhance 
completeness. All failure modes for one component should be addressed before 
proceeding to the next component. A tabular format is recommended for recording 
results. A FMEA worksheet is produced by beginning at a system boundary on a 
reference drawing and systematically evaluating the components in the order in 
which they appear in the process flow path. 
Failure Mode. The PrHA team should list all of the equipment item and interface 
failure modes. Given the equipment's normal operating condition, the team should 
consider all conceivable malfunctions. 
Cause(s). If desired, the root causes of the failure mode should be identified. 
Identification of root causes provides information helpful for ranking hazards. 
Operational Mode. If the equipment being analyzed is subject to different modes of 
operation, each operational mode should be identified and analyzed separately. 
Effects. For each identified failure mode, the PrHA team should describe the 
anticipated effects of the failure on the overall system or process. The key to 
performing a consistent FMEA is to assure that all equipment failures are analyzed 
using a common basis. Typically, analysts evaluate effects on a worst-case basis, 
assuming that existing safety levels do not work. However, more optimistic 
assumptions may be satisfactory as long as all equipment failure modes are analyzed 
on the same basis. 
Failure Detection Method. The means of failure detection should be identified, such 
as visual or warning devices, automatic sensing devices, sensing instrumentation, or 
other indicators. The main purpose of identifying failure detection methods is to 
determine whether the failure mode is "hidden," i.e., not detectable for some period 
of time. If there is no means to detect failure, "none" should be entered into the 
worksheet. 
Compensating Provisions. For each identified failure mode, the PrHA team should 
describe any design provisions, safety or relief devices, or operator actions that can 
reduce the likelihood of a specific failure or mitigate the consequences. 
Severity Class. The severity of the worst consequence should be specified as 
follows. 
Category I -  Catastrophic -  May cause death or loss of system or process. 
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Category II - Critical  - May cause severe injury, major property damage, or 
major system damage. 
Category III  - Marginal  - May cause minor injury, minor property damage, 
or minor system damage. 
Category IV - Minor -  Is not serious enough to cause injury, propertydamage, 
or system damage, but may result in unscheduled maintenance 
or repair. 
Remarks/Actions. For each identified failure mode, the PrHA team should suggest 
actions for reducing its likelihood or mitigating its effects. The actions suggested for 
a particular piece of equipment may focus on the causes or effects of specific failure 
modes or may apply to all of the failure modes collectively. 
If the team discovers that a single item failure is not detectable, the FMEA should be 
extended to determine if the effects of a second failure in combination with the first 
could have catastrophic consequences. When a safety, redundant, or back-up 
component is evaluated, the analysis should consider the conditions that generated 
the need for the component. 
DOCUMENTING THE RESULTS. A FMEA generates a qualitative, systematic reference 
list of equipment, failure modes, and effects. For each equipment item, the failure 
modes for that item and, if desired, the root causes for that failure mode are 
identified. For each failure mode, a worst-case estimate of the consequences is 
identified. This worst-case estimate assumes the failure of all protection against both 
the failure itself and the undesired consequences of the failure. The method by which 
the failure is detected is specified along with any compensating provisions. Finally, 
any suggestions for improving safety are listed in the table. 
Limitaitons of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
Human operator errors are not usually examined in a FMEA, but the effects of 
human error are indicated by an equipment failure mode. FMEAs rarely investigate 
damage or injury that could arise if the system or process operated successfully. 
Because FMEAs focus on single event failures, they are not efficient for identifying 
an exhaustive list of combinations of equipment failures that lead to accidents[14]. 
 
 
25 
 
 
 
 
6. QUANTITAITVE RISK ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES  
o Fault Tree Analysis 
o Markov Processes  
o Event Tree Analysis 
o Monte Carlo Simulation  
The most common way to model accident sequences is the event tree approach. This 
is particularly useful if the plant upset or equipment failure can result in different 
consequences from a risk stand point. If only one consequence needs to be analysed, 
all our quantitative methods can be applied. 
If the probability of failure on demand of a safety system has to be calculated, the 
fault tree technique, or the Markov Processes or the Monte Carlo simulation can be 
used. If applied properly, all three methodologies will generate the same results, 
taking into account the constraints of each methodology and a proper comparison of 
the results generated with the different approaches.  
6.1 Fault – Tree Analysis 
6.1.1 Description 
The fault tree technique can be described as an analytical technique, whereby an 
undesired state of the system is specified, and the system is then analyzed in the 
context of its environment and operation to find all credible ways in which the 
undesired event can occur. 
Fault tree analysis is a deductive failure analysis which focuses on one particular 
undesired event and which provides a method for determining causes of this event. 
The undesired event constitutes the top event in a fault tree diagram constructed for 
the system, and generally consists of a complete, or catastrophic, failure of the 
system under consideration. Careful formulation of the top event is important to the 
success of the analysis. The fault tree itself is a graphic model of the various parallel 
and sequential combinations of faults that will result in the occurrence of the 
predefined undesired event. The faults can be events that are associated with 
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component hardware failures, human errors, or any other pertinent event which can 
contribute to the top event[15]. 
It is important to understand that a fault tree is not a model of all possible system 
failures or all possible causes of system failure. A fault tree is tailored to its top 
event, which corresponds to some particular system failure mode, and the fault tree 
thus includes only those faults that contribute to this top event. It is also important to 
point out that a fault tree is not in itself a quantitative model. It is a qualitative model 
that can be evaluated quantitatively. The qualitative results generated with a fault tree 
are the minimal cut-sets and the qualitative insights which can be derived by 
evaluating the cut-sets[15]. 
A minimal cut-set is defined as a smallest combination of basic events that, if they all 
occur, will cause the top event to occur (for instance failure of a safety device). One 
speaks of a first-order minimal cut-set in case a single basic event causes the top 
event to occur. A second-order minimal cut-set is a combination of two single 
failures that, if they both occur, will cause the top event to occur. 
A fault tree is a complex of entities known as ”gates” which serve to permit or inhibit 
the passage of a fault logic up the troth gates show the relationships of events needed 
for the occurrence of a ”higher” event. The ”higher” event is the ”output” of the gate 
; the ”lower” events are the ”inputs” to the gate. The gate symbol denotes the type of 
relation of the input events required for the output event to occur. The lowest level 
events are called primary or basic events. Basic or primary events are singular events 
for which a probability of occurrence can be determined or estimated. These basic 
events can be associated with component hardware failure, human errors, 
maintenance or test unavailabilities or any other pertinent event that can contribute to 
the top event[16].  
6.1.2 Qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis of fault tree method 
To perform a fault tree analysis a number tasks have to be performed. In 
chronological order these tasks are : 
Qualitative analysis: 
 System familiarization. 
Before a fault tree can be constructed, one has to know in detail how the 
system operates and which failure modes have to be taken into account. 
 Definiton of the top event and construction of the fault tree. 
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 Determination of the minimal cut sets. 
 
Quantitative analysis: 
 Collecting all relevant failure, repair,test and maintenance data. 
 Quantification of the minimal cut-sets. 
 Evaluation of the results. 
In the below paragraphs these steps are explained in further detail by means of a 
simple example. 
System Familiarization  
The first step in a fault tree analysis is to get familiar with the system to be analyzed. 
Before one can construct a fault tree one has to know exactly how the system works 
and how the various components within the system can fail. If there is only a limited 
amount of information available on the system under consideration it might be 
necessary to perform a failure modes and effects analysis to identify all possible 
failures within the system[17]. 
To explain the different steps in a fault tree analysis, the safety  system as depicted in 
Figure 6.1 will be analyzed. 
The safety system consists of two sensors which for proper functioning require 
power supply E2. In case the maximum  tolerable temperature is exceeded, the 
sensors send a signal to the one-out of- two logic solver. This logic solver has a 
different power supply (E1) and in its turn sends a signal to two identical final 
elements (A1 and A2), which have the same power supply (E2). Only one of the final 
elements is needed to stop the process and prevent a hazard occurring.  
The failure modes to be considered in this example for the various components are: 
Sensors   : Failure to generate a signal given a high temperature 
Logic  : Failure to generate a trip signal to the final elements  
   given one or two trip signals from the sensors                                  
Final elements :          No action given a demand  
Power supply  :  No output 
The construciton of a fault tree starts with the definition of the top event. The top 
event is the top of the fault tree and must be defined unequivocally and can refer to 
only one specific operational state of the system. After definition of the top event the 
fault tree has to be constructed. The aim of the fault tree construction is to identify all 
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causes that contribute to the occurrence of the top event. To construct a fault tree 
 
Figure  6.1 : Safety system to be analyzed. 
reviewing of system drawings and system descriptions is necessary. Also it is often 
necessary to consult the supervisor, operator or maintenance crew of the system to 
identify all contributors to the top event[17]. 
6.1.3 Fault tree symbology 
A fault tree is generated by making a drawing using the symbols depicted in Table 
6.1. The construction of a fault tree always starts with the top event as the output of a 
logic gate. Next, all input events of the ”top event gate” have to be identified. These 
input events are represented by either new intermediate events or by one or more 
basic events. In fault trees basic events are end points. New intermediate events are 
again divided into ”lower” intermediate events and/or basic events. The basic events 
and intermediate events are mostly joined by ”and” or ”or” gates. This depends on 
the way in which they influence the output event[18]. 
The application of the ”AND” and ”OR” gate will be explained with the electrical 
diagram which is depicted in Figure 6.2. 
29 
 
 
Figure  6.2 : Electrical diagram. 
In the electrical diagram of Figure 6.2, there is no power at W1 if there is no power 
present at W2 and no power present at W3. In a fault tree this fault condition have to 
be represented by an ”AND” gate. Both input fault events ”No power at W2” and 
”No power at W3” have to occur to cause the top event ”No power at W1” to occur. 
This is depicted in Figure 6.3. 
 
Figure  6.3 : Example of an 'AND' gate. 
In the electrical diagram of figure 6.2, there is no power at W2 if switch S1 fails to 
close or there is no power at W4. In a fault tree this fault condition have to be 
represented by an ”OR” gate. One out of two input fault events ”Switch fails to  
close” or ”No power at W4” have to occur to cause the top event ”No power at W2” 
to occur. This is depicted in Figure 6.5. 
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Figure  6.4 : Fault tree symbols. 
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Figure  6.5 : Example of 'OR' gate. 
6.1.4 Rules for fault tree construction 
Fault tree construction is a process that can be performed in many ways depending 
on the experience and preferences of the fault tree analyst. To avoid errors in fault 
tree construction and to give guidance to the fault tree analysts a number of basic 
rules have been developed. Following these rules a fault tree can be obtained which 
is correct and easy to understand[19][20]. 
The rules can be summarized as follows: 
Rule 1: Correct definition of top event. 
The top event of the fault tree must be defined unequivocally and can refer to only 
one mode of operation and one specific fault condition of the system. 
Rule 2: Construction from top to bottom. 
A fault tree is always constructed from top to bottom. One starts with the top event 
and then works downwards, dissecting the system until one reaches the basic events. 
Rule 3: Consistently going upstream. 
Given the top event, one must move very consistently upstream through all flow 
paths. Whether they are electric, hydraulic or pneumatic currents or flows is 
irrelevant. It will become apparent that there is always some flow to be found. Each 
component fault is then taken into account. By applying this rule the probability of 
making errors is decreased as much as possible and components are treated in the 
right order. 
Rule 4: Complete the gate  
All inputs into a particular gate should be completely defined before further analysis 
of any one of them is undertaken. 
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Rule 5: No gate to gate connections. 
Gate inputs should be properly defined fault events, and gates should not be directly 
connected to other gates. 
Rule 6: No miracles. 
One might find, in the course of a system analysis, that the propagation of a 
particular fault sequence could be blocked by miraculous and totally unexpected 
failure of some other component. For instance it is not allowed to suppose a ”failure 
to open” of a check valve in the discharge line of a pump after a spurious actuation of 
the pump. The correct assumption to make is that the component functions normally, 
thus allowing the passage of the fault sequence in question. However, if the normal 
functioning of a component acts to block the propagation of a fault sequence, then 
the normal functioning must be defeated by faults if the fault sequence is to continue 
up the tree. 
Rule 7: Required level of detail 
In general it can be stated that the level of detail is sufficient in case the failure data 
of a certain event is known or if the probability of occurrence of a certain event is 
negligible compared to the probability of occurrence of the other events. 
Fault tree construction example 
A fault tree is an organized graphical representation of the conditions or other factors 
causing or contributing to the occurrence of a defined undesirable event, referred to 
as the ”top event”. 
The corresponding fault tree is depicted in Figure 6.5. 
Given rule 2, one needs to start at the point where the safety system interacts with the 
process. In this example the final elements 1 and 2 stop the process. So this must be 
the starting point of the fault tree construction. Given that one out of two final 
elements are required to stop the process, the process is not stopped if both final 
elements fail to operate. This implies that one has to start with an ”and-gate” because 
both final elements 1 and 2 have to fail in order to cause the top event to occur. 
Two intermediate events can be defined as input event for gate G 1. Final element 1 
fails to operate on demand and final element 2 fails to operate on demand. Next, one 
has to identify all causes why final element 1 is not able to operate. During this 
investigation one has to move upstream all process flows which are required for 
proper functioning of final element 1. Three causes can be identified why final 
element 1 is not able to operate on demand: 
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-  internal failure of final element 1 
-  no power supply from power supply E1 
-  no actuation signal from the one-out-of-two logic 
The occurrence of each of these three causes is sufficient to cause the intermediate 
event described by gate G2 to occur. This implies that gate G2 must be an ”or-gate”. 
The same holds for gate G3. 
Three input events have to be drawn for gate G2 and gate G3. Two input events are 
basic events which describe successively internal failure of the final element and 
failure of power supply 1. The third input event is the output event of gate G4 which 
represents the failure of the actuation signal. It must be emphasized that for gate G2 
and gate G3 a distinction has to be made between internal failure of final element 1 
and internal failure of final element 2. No distinction has to be made between power 
supply 1 for both gates G2 and G3 because it concerns failure of the same power 
supply. 
A transfer symbol to gate G4 is added to gate G2. This symbol means that the branch 
represented by the output of G4 is also applicable as input event for G3. 
Next, all failure causes of the actuation signal have to be identified. Careful review 
of the safety system shows that three causes can be identified: 
-  internal failure of the one-out-of-two logic 
-  failure of power supply 1 
-  no signal to the logic from both sensors. 
internal failure of the logic is represented by basic event BE4 and failure of the 
power supply E1 by basic event BE3. Given the design of the logic (one out of two) 
an ”and-gate” has to be used to describe failure of both actuation signals from the 
sensors. 
Going upstream the signal flow, two different causes can be identified why sensor 1 
does not generate an actuation signal. The first cause is an internal failure of the 
sensor and the second cause is a failure of the power supply E2. So, to describe the 
failure of sensor 1 to generate an actuation signal, an ”or-gate” G6 has to be added. 
Inputs for gate G6 are the basic events BE5 (sensor 1 fails) and BE6 (failure of 
power supply E2). The same rationale holds for failure of the actuation signal from 
sensor 2. The complete fault tree is depicted in Figure 6.6[18]. 
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Figure  6.6 : Fault tree safety system. 
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6.1.5 Application 
The strength of fault tree analysis as a qualitative tool is its ability to identify the 
combinations of equipment failures, dependent failures and human failures that can 
lead to an undesired consequence. This allows the analyst to focus preventive 
measures on basic causes to reduce the probability of occurrence. The technique is 
universally applicable to systems of all kinds[20]. 
6.1.6 Sofidity 
Important limitations of the technique are: 
-  the presumption that the relevant undesirable events have been identified 
- the presumption that contributing factors have been adequately identified and     
explored in sufficient depth[20]. 
Apart from these limitations, the technique as usually practised is regarded as being 
among the most thorough of those prevalent for general system application.  
6.1.7 Expertise required 
The basis of the fault tree technique is easy to understand and to apply in simple 
cases. Some years of experience are required to be able to perform a fault tree 
analysis of a complicated system. Prior knowledge of Boolean algebra and/or the use 
of logic gates is helpful[20]. 
6.1.8 Difficulty of application 
Application, though time-consuming, is not difficult once the technique has been 
mastered. Computer aids are available. Unlike Event-Tree Analysis and Failure 
Modes & Effects Analysis, the technique explores only those faults and conditions 
leading to the undesired (top) event. 
6.2 Markov Processes 
6.2.1 Description 
A state diagram of a system is constructed. The state diagram represents the status of 
the system with regard to its failure states. A specific failure state is represented by 
one node of the state diagram. The arrows between nodes, which represent the failure 
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events or repair events, are weighted with the corresponding failure rates or repair 
rates[21]. 
6.2.2 Application 
The Markov technique is most beneficial for analyzing systems where the sequence 
of failure is important or where repair is done on a continuous basis. The Markov 
technique can also be applied to the analysis of standby redundancies and state-
dependent failure rates. For reliability calculations the Markov process is taken as a 
discrete-state, continuous-time model. Each discrete state is normally given as a 
unique, well-defined condition of the relevant system components. In the simplest 
cases, the formulae which describe the probabilities of the system are readily 
available in the literature or can be calculated manually. In more complex cases, 
some methods of simplification can be applied. Results can be calculated also by 
computer simulation (numerical integration) of the graph. 
6.2.3 Sofidity 
The Markov technique is one of the most advanced quantitative analysis techniques 
in risk and reliability analysis. Especially in the case of analyzing different repair 
strategies the Markov technique is a powerful tool to support the reliability analyst. 
The disadvantage of this approach is that great care must be taken to eliminate 
possible dependent events. Dependency can be properly handled by the Markov 
technique if the system is modelled correctly[22]. 
6.2.4 Expertise required 
The technique is among the more difficult ones. Successful application to complex 
systems cannot be undertaken without formal study over a period of time, combined 
with practical experience. 
6.2.5 Difficulty of application 
Care must be taken to ensure that the state diagram is a realistic representation of the 
system. If this hurdle is passed, the solution can easily be obtained by the application 
of a suitable computer code[20]. 
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6.3 Event Tree Analysis 
6.3.1 Description 
Event trees are used to study or model event sequences which can result in different 
consequences. The first event of the event sequence is called the initiating event. 
Depending on the occurrence of one or more intermediate events different outcomes 
can occur. All possible outcomes relevant to the context of the study are included in 
the event tree. 
The objective of an event tree is to provide insight into the possible consequences of 
one initiating event which can lead to different consequences, while the objective of 
fault tree analysis is to clarify how one specific top event, can develop from an 
indefinite number of basis events[23]. 
The event trees can be used either for systems in which all components are 
continuously operating or for systems in which some or all of the components are in 
a standby mode that involve sequential operational logic and switching. The last type 
of system is generally associated with safety oriented systems to model accident 
sequences as the result of a general equipment failure or process upset, the initiating 
event. For this type of application an event tree analysis is an inductive process 
where the analyst begins with an initiating event and develops the possible sequences 
of events that lead to potential accidents. 
Although the event tree method is more widely used for safety oriented systems the 
applications of the technique to both types of systems proceed in a similar manner 
but with two particular differences between them. 
The first is that, with continuously operated systems, the events that can occur, i.e., 
the components that can fail, can be considered in any arbitrary order. With standby 
systems, or any system in which the operation of a particular component is 
dependent on the success or failure of another component, the sequence of events 
must be considered in the chronological order in which they occur. 
The second difference is the starting point of the event tree. In the case of 
continuously operating systems, the starting point is the system operating normally 
and the event tree is deduced as a sequence of events involving success and failure of 
the system components. In the case of standby systems and in particular, safety and 
mission oriented systems, the event tree is used to identify the various possible 
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outcomes of the system following a given initiating event which is generally an 
unsatisfactory operating event or situation. 
Event trees have found widespread applications in risk analyses for both the nuclear 
and chemical industries. These type of applications examines the systems in place 
that would prevent incidentprecursors from developing into incidents. The event tree 
analysis of such a system is often sufficient for the purpose of estimating the safety 
of the system. Human reliability analysis uses event trees to model all possible 
outcomes of one or more human failures[23]. 
6.3.2 Event tree analysis methodology 
In an event tree there are two types of event to be distinguished, the initiating event 
and the heading events. An event tree always starts with an initiating event. Other 
events following that initiating event are called heading or intermediate events. 
An initiating event can be recognized from the fact that the various heading events 
can occur only after occurrences of the initiating event. So the event tree is of interest 
only if the initiating event has taken place. During the development process of an 
event tree, conditioned thinking is required. The condition is that at least the 
initiating event has occurred. The heading events are only of interest after occurrence 
of the initiating event. 
Making an event tree is useful if: 
-  a specific event can result in more than one outcomes 
-  one is interested in the probability of occurrence of each of the      
different   outcomes. 
More than one outcome implies that several consequences are possible. If this is the 
case one must always try to make an event tree. For one event and one consequence, 
a fault tree should be sufficient. 
A good event tree offers some very important advantages :  
- All possible courses of accidents which can arise from one specific event 
are arranged in a convenient manner 
- An event tree often provides a very good framework for discussions. The 
point in the tree which is under discussion is clearly defined during 
discussions. This can then no longer be misinterpreted and the impatient 
can see whether or not their problem is coming up for discussion (at a 
different point in the tree) 
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- As soon as the principle of the event tree is known, everybody can 
understand why certain events do occur and why other combinations of 
events do not occur. 
In an event tree analysis at least two branches have to be considered for each heading 
event which plays a role in the accident sequence under consideration.[24]. 
6.3.3 Construction of an event tree 
The construction of an event tree, considering a specific initiating event, starts with 
the collection of all relevant heading events. The next step is to put the heading 
events in the right order. For safety applications the heading events are put in 
chronological order in accordance with the activation of the various safeguarding 
systems or physical processes which might occur after occurrence of the initiating 
event. Starting from the initiating even, event sequences are developed by defining 
branches for each relevant heading event. If the occurrence of a specific heading 
event does not influence the event sequence under consideration no branch is defined 
for that specific heading event. It should be emphasized that one can define more 
than two branches for a specific heading event if necessary. The only boundary 
condition is that the enumeration of all branch probabilities must be equal to one[25]. 
Nomenclature  
A - Initiating event  
B - Heading event 
C - Heading event 
D - Heading event 
E - Heading event 
F - Heading event 
 
B* - Heading event B does not occur  
C* - Heading event C does not occur 
D* - Heading event D does not occur 
E* - Heading event E does not occur 
F* - Heading event F does not occur 
 
P - Probability 
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P(A) - Probability of iniating event A for one year of operation 
P(B) - Conditional probability of event B  
P(C) - Conditional probability of event C  
P(D) - Conditional probability of event D  
P(E) - Conditional probability of event E  
P(F) - Conditional probability of event F 
 
6.3.4 Event tree quantification 
The quantification of an event tree will be explained will an example. The example is 
a postincident analysis of a large leakage of pressurized flammable material from an 
isolated LPG storage tank. An HAZOP analysis indicates that the potential 
consequences include BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion) of the 
tank if the leak is ignited (either immediately or by flashback). If the leak does not 
immediately ignite, the cloud can drift away. The cloud can be ignited in that case by 
several ignition sources and explode UVCE (Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion), or 
produce a flash fire some time later. An event tree is developed to predict possible 
outcomes from the leakage of LPG. The event tree is depicted in Figure 6.7. 
 
Figure  6.7 : Event tree for the LPG leakage initiating event. 
 
The heading events are defined as follows: 
A: Large LPG leakage from vessel (Initiating event) 
B: Immediate ignition  
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C: Delayed ignition 
D: Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion 
B* - Heading event B does not occur  
C* - Heading event C does not occur 
D* - Heading event D does not occur 
A total of four outcomes are identified: a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Vapor 
Explosion, A Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion, a Flash or Safe dispersal. 
Assuming independence between the various heading events, the probability of 
occurunce of the different consequences can be calculated with the following 
formulas: 
P(Safe dispersal) = P(A) * (1-P(B)) * (1-P(C)) 
P(Flash Fire)  = P(A) * (1-P(B)) * P(C) * (1-P(D)) 
P(UVCE)  = P(A) * (1-P(B)) * P(C) * P(D) 
P(BLEVE)  = P(A) * P(B) 
 
Suppose that the following data is valid for this situation: 
P(A) =  5.0E-07 for one year of operation 
P(B) =  0.7   - 
P(C) =  0.7   - 
P(D) =  0.1   - 
P(Safe dispersal)   =  5.0E-07 * (1 - 0.7) * (1 - 0.7) 
 =  4.5E-08                             for one year of operation 
 
P(Flash Fire)   =  5.0E-07 * (1 - 0.7) * 0.7 * (1 - 0.1) 
 =  9.8E-08                             for one year of operation 
 
P(UVCE)                   =  5.0E-07 * (1 - 0.7) * 0.7 * 0.1 
 =  1.05E-08                                for one year of operation 
 
P(BLEVE)   = 5.0E-07 * 0.7 
 =        3.5E-07                                     for one year of operation 
 
The total frequency of all outcomes is a check to ensure that this equals the initiating 
event frequency of 5.0E-07 per year. 
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6.3.5 Event tree development procedure  
The construction of an event tree is sequential, and like fault tree analysis, is top-
down (left-right in the usual event tree convention). The construction begins with the 
initiating event, and the temporal sequences of occurrence of all relevant safety 
functions or events are entered. Each branch of the event tree represents a separate 
outcome (event sequence). The process of event tree development can be divided in a 
number of steps. A concise description of each step will be provided: [24][25]. 
Step 1 : ldentification of the initiating event. 
The initiating event, in many quantitative risk assessments, is a failure event 
corresponding to a release of hazardous material or a plant disturbance which can 
lead to serious consequences if one or more safety devices fail. The initiating event 
might correspond to a pipe leak, a vessel rupture, an internal explosion, etc. 
Step 2: ldentification of safety function/ Hazard Promoting Factor and Outcome 
definition. 
A safety function is a device, action, or barrier, that can interrupt the sequence from 
an initiating event to a hazardous outcome. A hazard promoting factor may change 
the final outcome (e.g., from a dispersion cloud to a flash fire or to a UVCE). 
Step 3: Construction of event tree. 
The event tree graphically displays the chronological progression of an incident. 
Starting with the initiating event, the event tree is constructed left to right. At each 
heading or node two or more alternatives are analysed until a final outcome is 
obtained for each branch. Only nodes that materially affect the outcome should be 
shown explicitly in the event tree. Some branches may be more fully developed than 
others. In pre-incident analysis, the final sequence might correspond to successful 
termination of some initiating events or a specific failure mode. The listing of the 
safe recovery and incident conditions is an important output of this analysis. For a 
post-incident analysis, the final result might correspond to the type of incident 
outcome. The event heading should be indicated at the top of the page, over the 
appropriate branch of the event tree. If possible the heading events should describe 
the undesired situation. It is usually to have the YES branch downward and the NO 
branch upward. Starting with the initiating event, each heading event is labelled with 
a letter identifier. Every final event sequence can then be specified with a unique 
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letter combination. A bar over the letter indicates that the designated event did not 
occur. 
Step 4: Classify the outcomes. 
The objective in constructing the event tree is to identify important possible 
outcomes that are important contributors to risk to be quantified. Thus, if an 
estimated of the risk of offsite fatalities is the goal of the analysis, only outcomes 
relevant to that outcome need be developed. Branches leading to lesser consequences 
can be left undeveloped. Many outcomes developed through different branches of the 
event tree will be similar. The final event tree outcomes can be classified according 
to type of consequence model that must be employed to complete the analysis. 
Step 5: Estimation of the conditional probability of each branch in the event tree. 
The each heading in the event tree (other than the initiating event) corresponds to a 
conditional probability of some outcome if the preceding event has occurred. Thus, 
the probabilities associated with each limb must sum to 1.0 for each heading. This is 
true for either binary or multiple outcomes from a node. The source of conditional 
probabilities may be historical records, plant and process data, equipment reliability 
data, human reliability data, expert opinion. It may be necessary to use fault tree 
techniques to determine some probabilities, especially for complex safety systems in 
pre-incident analysis. 
Step 6: Quantification of the outcomes. 
The frequency of each outcome may be determined by multiplying the initiating 
event frequency with the conditional probabilities along the path leading to that 
outcome. It should be emphasized that this type of quantification is only allowed if 
the initiating event frequency and the conditional probabilities can be considered all 
as independent events. 
Step 7: Evaluation. 
The results of the event tree analysis should be tested with common sense and 
against system or process understanding and historical records. Dominant 
contributors to risk can be identified and recommendations to decrease the risk level 
can be formulated. 
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6.3.6 Application 
The technique is universally applicable to systems of all kinds, with the limitation 
that unwanted events (as well as wanted events) must be anticipated to produce 
meaningful analytical results. 
6.3.7 Sofidity 
The technique can be exhaustively thorough, Solidity has only two theoretical limits, 
i.e. the presumptions that: 
- all system events have been anticipated 
- all consequences of those events have been explored. 
6.3.8 Expertise required 
The technique is among the more difficult. Successful application to complex 
systems cannot be undertaken without formal study over a period of time, combined 
with practical experience. 
6.3.9 Difficulty of application 
The technique is not particularly difficult to apply. It is, however, time-consuming. It 
must be recognized that the exploration of all wanted events and their consequences 
increases the effort substantially. 
6.4 Monte Carlo Simulation 
6.4.1 Description 
Some practical problems in risk and reliability analysis cannot be solved by 
analytical methods and require numerical simulation. Thus, rather than attempt to 
analytically analyse the effects on inputs described with probability distributions, e.g. 
failure rates of components, Monte Carlo techniques represent the distributions as 
sequences of discrete random values. The technique consists of building, usually 
with a computer code, a probabilistic model of the system under investigation. A trial 
run of the model is repeated many times, and each time one discrete value of the 
performance of the simulated system is recorded. After a sufficiently large number of 
computer runs, these discrete values can be combined into one probability 
distribution which describes the system parameter of interest[26]. 
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6.4.2 Application 
The technique requires the building of a probabilistic model of the system, 
translation of this model into a computer model, estimation of the probability 
distributions of the input parameters and composition and interpretation of the output 
probability distribution. It will be clear that this is a time-consuming process and 
requires various skills. For this reason it is advisable to use the Monte Carlo 
technique only in those cases where analytical methods fail. 
6.4.3 Sofidity 
Very realistic results can be generated with the Monte Carlo technique. Almost all 
aspects can be incorporated into the probabilistic model. 
6.4.4 Expertise required 
Analysts need to be familiar with system reliability techniques and need to have a 
detailed understanding of probability distributions. In most cases some computer 
programming is necessary to model the probabilistic system model. Interpretation of 
the results requires analysts to be familiar with median, mean and upper and lower 
bounds of probability distributions. 
6.4.5 Difficulty of application 
The analyst must be familiar with probability distribution and random number 
generators. Also some computer programming is required in most cases. 
In the case of very reliable systems a large number of computer runs are required to 
generate a probability distribution. New techniques have been developed to save 
computer time[26]. 
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7. EXPLOSION 
An explosion involves the production of a pressure discontinuity or blast wave 
resulting from a rapid release energy. A pressure disturbance is generated in to the 
surrounding medium. Air becomes heated due to its compressibility and this leads to 
an increase in the velocity of sound, causing the front of distrubance to steepen as it 
travels through the air. The loading and hence the damge to the nearby targets are 
governed by the magnitude of and duration of pressure waves. Missiles may be 
generated by an explosion and are capable of causing severe damage to adjacent 
plant structures and people. The explosions mainly occurs due to the rapid 
combustion of a flammable material but can be brought about the chemical reactions 
other than combustion, provided they release large amount of energy (heat)[27]. 
Classification of Explosions  
 Chemical Explosions 
 Physical Explosions 
 Vapour Cloud Explosions 
7.1 Chemical Explosion 
Chemical explosions in plant or in vessel can arise due to exothermic reaction 
occurring internally. Such reaction may involve decomposition of unstable 
substances, polymerization of monomers, or combustion of fuel oxidant mixtures. 
Heating and increase of molecular number can result in a rise in pressure to the 
bursting point of the vessel, and exlosives decompose so quickly that confinement 
and development of pressure are self – imposed[27]. 
7.2 Physical Explosion  
It occurs simply due to over pressure as in the case of steam boiler and air receiver 
explosions. Fire is not necessarily a consequence. But fire involving stock, buildings 
and plant ancillaries can cause physical explosions due to overheating followed by  
overpressure in vessels and also the fireballs if contents are flammable. One such 
case is termed as Boling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE)[27]. 
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7.2.1 BLEVE 
BLEVE – (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion) occurs when a vessel 
containing liquid under pressure, such as a liquid propane tank, is subjected to a 
temperature above the liquid’s boiling point. If heat raises the pressure inside the 
sealed tank to the point where the vessel can no longer contain the pressure, the 
vessel will mechanically fail and a BLEVE will occur. If the liquid inside the tank is 
flammable a fire will often ensue. If not, the BLEVE  will still occur, but the vapors 
will not ignite (a steam boiler is a common example of this). BLEVEs can also be 
caused by mechanical damage or overfilling[28]. 
The boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE) happens when a vessel 
holding a pressure liquefied gas (PLG) fails catastrophically. The vessel failure may 
be due to:  
 Severe fire exposure  
 Severe overpressure  
 Severe corrosion  
 Severe mechanical impact  
 Severe manufacturing flaw 
 Or a combination of all of the above 
A pressure liqufied gas (PLG) is normally at vapour at ambient pressure and 
temperature but is stored as a liquid under pressure at ambient temperature. If the 
containment is suddenly lost then the liquid is sent to into state of superheat, and this 
can lead to sudden and violent phase change of a large fraction of the liquid. The 
BLEVE is the explosive release of expanding vapour and flashing liquid. Hazards 
from a BLEVE include blast overpressure, projectiles, possible toxic release and if 
flammable a fireball, flash fire or a vapour cloud explosion (VCE)[29]. 
Overpressure :  
Overpressure, also called blast wave, refers to the sudden onset of a pressure wave 
after an explosion. This pressure wave is caused by the energy released in the initial 
explosion – the bigger the initial explosion, the more damaging the pressure wave. 
Pressure waves are nearly instantaneous, traveling at the speed of sound. Although a 
pressure wave may sound less dangerous than a fire or a toxic cloud, it can be just as 
damaging and just as deadly. The pressure wave radiates outward and generates 
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hazardous fragments (such as building debris and shattered glass). Additionally, 
these waves can damage buildings or even knock them flat – often organs like the 
ears and lungs. The below table relates overpressure values to the structural and 
physiological effects produced[30]. 
Table 7.1 : Expected damage by overpressure. 
 
Lees, Frank P. 1980. Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Vol. 1. London and 
Boston: Butterworths. 
 
7.3 Vapour Cloud Explosion 
A vapor cloud explosion is a process where a combustion of a premixed gas results 
in a rapid increase in pressure. Before a vapor cloud explosion is possible, there are 
several events that must occur. These events are illustrated in Figure 7.1. As the 
figure shows, it is essential to have a release of gas in order to have an explosion. 
Secondly, ignition must be present to ignite the released gas, which could result in 
fire or an explosion[31]. 
Vapour cloud explosions can take place in buildings or offshore modules, inside 
process equipment or pipes, in open process areas, or in unconfined areas. The vapor 
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cloud explosions are classified based on the environment in which the explosion 
occurs. There are generally three types of explosions[31]: 
 Confined gas explosions within vessels, pipes, channels or tunnels  
 Partly confined gas explosions in compartments, buildings or offshore modules.  
 Unconfined gas explosions in process plants and other unconfined areas.  
 
Figure  7.1 : Events leading to gas explosion, BLEVE - boiling liquid expanding 
vapour explosion. 
An unconfined vapour cloud explosion in a processing plant can involve partly 
confined explosions in closed modules or highly congested areas where the vapor 
cloud has leaked. Confined vapour cloud explosions, so called internal explosions, 
are explosions which take place within processing equipment, tanks, pipes, sewage 
systems, culverts, and closed rooms. The combustion process in this kind of 
explosion does not need to be quick to result in a severe pressure increase. Partly 
confined explosions take place when flammable material is accidentally discharged 
inside a building which is partly open, such as compressor rooms and offshore 
modules. The building will contain the explosion but the explosion overpressure can 
only be relieved through the explosion vent panels, or through breakdown of the 
surrounding walls [31].  
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Unconfined vapor cloud explosions take place in open areas such as hydrocarbon and 
petrochemical processing plants. It has been demonstrated in large-scale tests that an 
actually unconfined, unobstructed flammable vapor cloud ignited by a weak ignition 
source will lead to flash fire. In a real hydrocarbon processing plant, however, there 
are partly confined and obstructed local areas such as pipe racks which could cause 
deflagration with high overpressures. A deflagration has a limited burning velocity, 
in the range 100–500 m/s. On the other hand, if an unconfined vapor cloud detonates, 
the resulting overpressure will be very high, in the order of 20 bars. Most vapor 
cloud explosions on onshore and offshore hydrocarbon processing plants would fall 
into the category of deflagrations [31].  
7.3.1 Vapor cloud explosion modelling 
When examining the vapor cloud explosion overpressure prediction methodologies, 
it was found that there exist different models which vary from simple empirical 
models to more sophisticated and complex models. These models have been 
classified as follows: 
 Empirical models: These models are based on correlations developed from 
analysis of experimental data. They are considered very simple models and 
their applicability is very limited. In addition, these models cannot handle 
complex geometries and as a result, they have significantly simplified the 
physics. Despite all aforementioned limitations, these models can be usefully 
used for quick order-of-magnitude calculations and for screening purposes for 
more analysis with more complex models.  
 Phenomenological models: These models are slightly more complex and have 
a broader range of applicability than the previous models. These models are 
based on differential and algebraic equations which describe the physical 
process involved in the vapor cloud explosions. These models can model 
certain types of geometry by representation of an idealized system. In terms 
of sophistication, phenomenological models are somewhere between 
empirical models and complex Computational Fluid Dynamics models. These 
type of models has short running times and can run a large number of 
different scenarios.  
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 Computational Fluid Dynamic (CFD) models: CFD models find the 
numerical solutions of the Navier-Stokes equations which govern the fluid 
flow. The numerical solutions are developed by discretizing the solution 
domain in both space and time. CFD has a wide range of applicability and 
can be used in many different disciplines. When comparing CFD with 
empirical and phenomenological models, CFD provides greater flexibility 
and accuracy. However, the main limitations of CFD are the process run time 
and the complexity of using it [31]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 
 
 
 
 
 
8. TOXIC RELEASE 
The prevailing wind speed and the weather conditions play the important role in 
determining the dimensions of the toxic plume. To understand exposure limits 
and their respective effects we can divide the affected area in to three zones of 
various concentration levels. The table describes the limits and effects [32]. 
Table 8.1 : Toxic release effects and limits. 
Concentration 
Level 
Observed Effects 
Short -Term 
Exposure Limit 
(STEL)  Blue Zone  
Maximum concentration of the substance to which workers 
can be exposed for a period up to 15 minutes without 
suffering (a) Intolerable Irritation (b) Chronic or irreversible 
tissue change (c) narcosis of sufficient degree to increase 
accident proneness, impair self rescue, or materially reduce 
worker efficiency, provided that no more than 04 excursion 
per day are permitted, with at least 60 minutes between 
exposure periods, and provided that daily TLV is not 
exceeded. It should not be used to evaluate the toxic 
exposure upto 30 minutes. 
Immediately 
Danger to Life and 
Health (IDLH) 
Orange Zone 
An atmospheric concentration of any toxic, corrosive or 
asphyxiant sustance that poses an immediate threat to life 
or would cause irreversible or delayed adverse health 
effects or would interfere with an individual's ability to 
escape from a dangerous atmosphere. If IDLH values are 
exceed, all unprotected people must elave the area 
immediately. The maximum airborne concentration of a 
susbtance to which a worker is exposed for long as 30 
minutes and still be able to escape without loss of life. 
Lethal 
Concentration at 
50% mortality 
(LC50) Red Zone 
LC stands for 'Lethal Concentration'. LC values usually refer 
to the concentration of a chemical in air but in 
environmental studies it can also mean the concentration 
of a chemical in water. For inhalation experiments, the 
concentration of the chemical in air that kills 50% of the 
test animals in agiven time (usually half to four hours) is the 
LC50 value. 
Fatal Level  Death 
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9. FIRE  
The Fire is a process of burning that produces heat, light and often smokes and 
flames. The effect of fire on the people takes the form of skin burn due to the 
exposure to thermal radiation. The severity of the burns depends upon the intensity 
of the heat and exposure time. In general terms the skin withstands heta energy of 
10Kw/m
2
 for approximately 8 seconds and that of 30kW/m
2
 for 0.4 seconds before 
pain is felt. The effect of various heat radiation levels is given in the table below 
[33]. 
Table 9.1 :  Radiation effects. 
Radiation Level 
(kW/m2) 
Observed Effect  
37.5 (Red zone) Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment 
25 
Minimum energy required to ignite wood at 
indefinitely long exposures (non-piloted) 
12.5 (Orange 
zone) 
Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of 
wood,  melting of plastic 
10 
Pain threshold reached after 8 second; second 
degree burns after 25 second 
4,7 Accepted value to represent injury 
4 (Blue zone ) 
Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to 
reach cover within 20 seconds; however blistering 
of the skin (second degree burns) is likely;0: 
lethality 
1,6 Will cause no discomfort for the long exposure  
  
Fire can takes several different forms i.e. 
 Flash Fire  
 Jet Fire 
 Pool Fire  
 Secondary Fire 
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9.1 Flash Fire 
A flash fire occurs when a cloud of flammable gas and air is ignited. The speed of 
burning is function of the concentration of the flammable component in the cloud 
and also the wind speed. Within a few second of ignition the flame spreads both 
upwind and downwind of the ignition source. Initially the flame is contained with in 
the cloud due to premixed burning of the regions within the flammable limits. 
Subsequnetly the flame extends in the form of a fire plume above the cloud. The 
downwind edge of the flame starts to move towards the spill point after consuming 
the flammable vapor downwind of the ignition source. The duration of this fire is 
very short and damage is caused by thermal radiation and oxygen depletion [33]. 
 
9.2 Jet Fire 
A jet fire occurs when a flammable liquid  or gas is ignited after its release from a 
pressurized, punctured vessel or pipe. The pressure of release generates a long flame, 
which is stable under most conditions. A flash flame may take the form of jet flame  
on reaching the spill point. The duration of the jet fire is determined bt the release 
rate and capcity of the source. Flame length increases directly with flow rate. 
Typically a pressuized release of 8kg/s would have a length of 35m. The cross winds 
also affects the flame length [33]. 
9.3 Pool Fire 
A pool fire occurs on ignition of an accumulation of liquid as a pool on the ground or 
on water or other liquid. A steadily burning fire is rapidly achieved as the flame 
vapour to sustain the fire is provided by evaporation of liquid by heat from the 
flames. The maximum burning rate is function of the net heat of combustion and heat 
required for its vaporization. Generally heat radiation dominates the burning rate for 
lame greater than 1m diameters. Big pool fire is hazardous and disastrous to control 
it. This type of fire is prominent in tank farm areas and in bulk depots of petroleum 
products where petrol, diesel are stored. Jaipur fire of the 2009 was the worst 
example of pool fire in Indian history where we lost petroleum products of worth 
crores and human lives and property. District collectors have to audits such bulk 
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depots from disaster prevention angle and should be in the priority list of their 
administration [33]. 
9.4 Secondary Fire 
The secondary fire involves the combustion of flammable materials those are not 
directly concerned with the process, and some time present unnecessarily. For 
example : 
 Stored raw material and procducts, including packaging materials; 
 Combustile insulation of vessels, pipelines and electrical cables; 
 Combustile building material and linings. 
Protection is by elimination or segregation of combustile materials, use of 
incombustible materials of construction and insulation, and control of ignition 
sources. Careless or deliberate actions may defeat in-built precautions[33]. 
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10. OIL SPILLS AND DISASTERS 
The following list includes major oil spills since 1967. The circumstances 
surrounding the spill, amount of oil spilled, and the attendant environmenta damage 
is also given. 
 1967 March 18, Cornwall, Eng.: Torrey Canyon ran aground, spilling 38 
million gallons of crude oil off the Scilly Islands 
 1976 December 15, Buzzards Bay, Mass.: Argo Merchant ran aground and 
broke apart southeast of Nantuclet Island, spilling its entire cargo of 7.7 
million gallons of fuel oil. 
 1977 April, Nort Sea: blowout of well in Ekofisk oil field leaked 81 million 
gallons. 
 1978 March 16, off Portsall, France: wrecked supertanker Amoco Cadiz 
spilled 68 million gallons, causing widespread environmental damage over 
100 mi of Brittany coast. 
 1979 June 3, Gulf of Mexico: exploratory oil well Ixtoc 1 blew out, spilling 
an estimated 140 million gallons of crude oil into the open sea. Although it is 
one of the largest known oil spills, it had a low environmental impact 
 1979 July 19, Tobago: the Atlantic Empress and Aegean Captain collided, 
spilling 46 million gallons of crude. While being towed, the Atlantic Empress 
spilled an additional 41 million gallons off Barbados on Aug.2. 
 1980 March 30, Stavanger, Norway: floating hotel in North Sea collapsed, 
killing 123 oil workers. 
 1983 February 4, Persian Gulf, Iran: Nowruz Field platform spilled 80 million 
gallons of oil. 
 1983 Aug.6, Cape Town, South Africa: the Spanish tanker Castillo de Beliver 
caught fire, spilling 78 million gallons of oil off the coast. 
 1988 July 6, North Sea off Scotland: 166 workers killed in eplosion and fire 
on Occidental Petroleum’s Piper Alpha rig in North Sea; 64 survivors. It is 
the world’s worst offshore oil disaster. 
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 1988 November 10, Saint John’s, Newfoundland: Odyssey spilled 43 million 
gallons of oil. 
 1989 March 24, Prince William Sound, Alaska: tanker Exxon Valdez hit an 
undersea reef and spilled 10 million – plus gallons of oil into the water. 
 1989 December 19, off Las Palmas, the Canary Islands: explosion in Irarian 
supertanker, the Kharg-5, caused 19 million gallons of crude oil to spill into 
Atlantic Ocean about 400 mi north of Las Palmas, forming a 100-square-mile 
oil slick. 
 1990 June 8, off Galveston, Texas: Mega Borg released 5.1 million gallons of 
oil some 60 nautical miles south-southeast of Galveston as a result of an 
explosion and subsequent fire in the pump room. 
 1991 January 23-27, southern Kuwait: during the Persian Gulf War, Iraq 
deliberately released 240-460 million gallons of crude oil into the Persian 
Gulf from tankers 10 mi off Kuwait. Spill had little military significance. On 
january 27, U.S. warplanes bombed pipe systems to stop the flow     of oil. 
 1991 April 11, Genoa, Italy: Heaven spilled 42 million gallons of oil in 
Genoa port. 
 1991 May 28, Angola: ABT Summer exploded and leaked 15-78 million 
gallons of oil off the coast of Angola. It’s not clear how much sank or burned. 
 1992 March 2, Fergana Valley, Uzbekistan: 88 million gallons of oil spilled 
from an oil well. 
 1993 August 10, Tampa Bay, Fla.: three ships collided, the barge Bouchard 
B155, the freighter Balsa 37, and the barge Ocean 255. The Bouchard spilled 
an estimated 336,000 gallons of No.6 fuel oil into Tmapa Bay. 
 1994 September 8, Russia: dam built to contain oil burst and spilled oil into 
Kolva River tributary.U.S. Energy Department estimated spill at 2 million 
barrels. Russian state-owned oil company claimed spill was only 102,000 
barrels. 
 1996 February 15, off Welsh coast: supertanker Sea Empress ran aground at 
port of Milford Haven, Wales, spewed out 70,000 tons of crude oil, and 
created a 25-mile slick. 
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 1999 December 12, French Atlantic coast: Maltese-registered tanker Erika 
broke apart and sank off Britanny, spilling 3 million gallons of heavy oil into 
the sea. 
 2000 January 18, off Rio de Janerio: rupture pipeline owned by government 
oil company, Petrobas, spewed 343,200 gallons of heavy oil into Guanabara 
Bay. 
 2000 November 28, Mississippi River south of New Orleans: oil tanker 
Westchester lost power and ran aground near Port Sulphur, la., dumping 
567,000 gallons of crude oil into lower Mississippi. Spill was largest in U.S. 
waters since Exxon Valdez disaster in March 1989. 
 2002 November 13, Spain: Prestige suffered a damaged hull and was towed 
to sea and sank. Much of the 20 million gallons oil remains underwater. 
 2003 July 28, Pakistan: The Tasman Spirit, a tanker, ran aground near the 
Karachi port, and eventually cracked into two pieches. One of its four oil 
tanks burst open, leaking 28,000 tons of crude oil into the sea. 
 2004 December 7, Unalaska, Aleutian, Alaska: A major storm pushed the 
M/V Selendang Ayu up onto a rocky shore, breaking it in two. 337,000 
gallons of oil were released, most of which was driven onto the shoreline of 
Makushin ans Skan Bays. 
 2005 Aug.-Sept.,New Orleans, Louisiana: The coast Guard estimated that 
more 7 million gallons of oil were spilled during Hurricane Katrina from 
various sources, including pipelines, strorage tanks and industrial plants. 
 2006 June 19, Calsasieu River, Louisiana: An estimated 71,000 barrels of 
waste oil were released from a tank at he CITGO Refinery on the Calcasieu 
River during a violent rain storm. 
 2006 July 15, Beirut, Lebanon: The Israeli navy bombs the Jieh coast power 
station, and between three million and ten million gallons of oil leaks into the 
sea, affecting nearly 100 miles of coastline. A coastal blockade, a result of the 
war, greatly hampers outside clean-up efforts. 
 2006 August 11th, Guimaras island, The Philippines: A tanker carrying 
530,000 gallons of oil sinks off the coast th Philippines, putting the country’s 
fishing and tourism industries at great risk. The ship sinks in deep water, 
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making it virtually unrecoverable, and it contiunes to emit oil into the ocean 
as other nations are called in to assist in the massive clean-up efforts. 
 2007 December 7, South Korea: Oil spill causes environmental disater, 
destroying beaches, coating birds and oysters with oil, and driving away 
tourists with its stench. The Hebei Spirit collides with a steel wire connecting 
a tug boat and barge five miles off South Korea’s west coast, spilling 2.8 
million gallonns of crude oil. Seven thousand people are trying to clean up 12 
miles of oil-coated coast. 
 2008 July 25, New Orleans, Louisiana: A 61-foot barge, carrying 419,000 
gallons of heavy fuel, collides with a 600-foot tanker ship in the Mississippi 
River near New Orleans. Hundreds of thousands of gallos of fuel leak from 
the barge, causing a halt to all river traffic while cleanup efforts commence to 
limit environmental fallout on local wildlife. 
 2009 March 11, Queensland, Australia: During Cyclone Hamish, unsecured 
cargo aboard the containes ship MV Pacific Adventurer came loose on deck 
and caused the release of 52,000 gallons of heavy fuel and 620 tons of 
ammonium nitrate, a fertilizer, into the Coral Sea. About 60 km of Sunshine 
Coast was covered in oil, prompting the closure of half the area’s beaches. 
 2010 January 23, Port Arthur, Texas: The oil tanker Eagle Otome and a barge 
collide in the Sbaine-Neches Waterway, causing the release of about 462,000 
gallons were recovered and 175,000 gallons were disperdes or evaporated, 
according to th U.S. Coast Guard. 
 2010 April 24, Gulf of Mexico: The Deepwater Horizon, a semi-submersible 
drilling rig, sank on Aprill 22, after an April 20th explosion on the vessel. 
Eleven people died in the blast. When the rig sank, the riser – 5,000-foot-long 
pipe thah connects the wellhead to the rig – became detached and began 
leaking oil. In addtion, U.S. Coast Guard investigators discovered a leak in 
the wellhead itself. As much as 60,000 barrels of oil per day were leaking 
into the water, threating wildlife along the Louisiana Coast. Homeland 
Security Secretary Janet Napolitano declared it a ‘spill of national 
significance.’ BP (British Petroleum), which leased the Deepwater Horizon, 
is reponsible for the cleanup, but he U.S. Navy supplied the company with 
resources to help contain the slick. Oil reached the Louisiana shore on April 
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30, affected about 125 miles of coast. By early June, oil had also reached 
Florida, Alabama and Mississippi. It is the largest oil spill in U.S. history 
[34]. 
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11. THE PETROLEUM PIPELINE CORPORATION (BOTAS) 
The Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS) was established on 15 August 1974 to 
trasnport crude oil. Since 1987 it has engaged in natural gas transportation and trade 
activities as well and has become the leading company in natural gas and crude oil 
sectors. The main activities of BOTAS are crude oil and natural gas trasnportation 
and pipeline operation as well marine terminal operations. The plant contain thirteen 
crude oil strorage tanks. One of the tank is always empty for emergency situations. 
The strorage tank volume capcity are different. Three of them capacity are 50000 m
3
 
and the others are 135000 m
3
. The maximum discharge velocity of crude oil to tank 
is 4500m
3
/hour and maximum load velocity of crude oil from tank to ship is 
13000m
3
/hour.  The average temperature of crude oil is between 62-65 °F and the 
gravity is API 34.40.  
The purpose of this study for this plant to  
 Calculate and show potential risk profiles of plant with the following major 
hazard scenarios. 
 Analyse the profiles;  
 Determine and  prepare emergency plans for these scenarios. 
11.1 BOTAS Hazard Scenarios 
Scenario 1 – A catastrophic leak from pipeline connection point to the crude oil 
storage tank . 
Tank volume : 135,000 m
3
 ; Tank height : 17 m; Tank diameter : 100 m; Diameter of 
pipe : 30 inch ; Discharge velocity to the tank : 4500 m
3
/hour ; 
Scenario 2 – A small leakage ( 1 % pipe area ) from pipeline connection point to the 
crude oil storage tank .  
Tank volume : 135,000 m
3
 ; Tank height : 17 m; Tank diameter : 100 m; Diameter of 
pipe : 30 inch ; Discharge velocity to the tnak : 4500 m
3
/hour ; 
Scenario 3 – A catastrophic leak from pipeline connection point to ship’s storage 
tank  at the marine terminal.  
The maximum load velocity of crude oil from tank to ship : 13,000 m
3
/hour ;  
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Diameter of pipe to the ship : 18 inch ; 
  
 
11.2 Scenario 1 -  Phast User Defined Data  
Scenario 
 Release Location 
  Tank Head                 17 m 
  [Elevation                 1   m] 
Material 
 Material 
  [Material characteristic                   Flammable only] 
  [Material to track                      Mixture] 
Discharge parameters  
 Droplet breakup mechanism  
  [Droplet break-up mechanism-instantaneous  Use flashing correlation] 
Dipersion 
 Dispersion scope 
  [Specify user-defined averaging time                                               No] 
Bund, building and terrain: Default terrain  
 Dispersing surface 
  [Surface over which the dispersion occurs                                    Land] 
  [Surface roughness length                                              User-defined] 
  [User-defined length                                                          183.156 mm] 
Bund, building and terrain 
 Building definition 
  [Specify a release building       No] 
  [Building wake effect                                                                    None] 
Flammable  
 Fireball emissive power  
  Use vessel burst pressure         No 
 Ignition and explosion  
  [Supply late igniton location                                   No igniton location] 
  [Explosion method                                                                          
TNT] 
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Explosion prameters 
 TNT parameters  
  [Air or ground burst                                                                 Air burst] 
  [Default TNT explosion efficiency                                      0.1 fraction] 
 Vapour liquid method  
  [Use of exlosion mass modification factor      Early and late explosion] 
  [Explosion mass modification factor                                                   3] 
Pool fire  
 Parameters 
  [Radiative fraction for general fires                                     0.4 fraction] 
 Radiation levels 
  [Number of input radiation levels         3] 
  [Intensity levels (1)                                                                  4 kW/m
2
] 
  [Intensity levels (2)                                                             12.5 kW/m
2
] 
  [Intensity levels (3)                                                             37.5 kW/m
2
] 
DISCHARGE DATA for Weather:  Wether folder\Category 1.5/F 
 Wind Speed:                         1.50m/s 
 Wind Speed at Height (Claculated)                      0.46m/s 
 Pasquill Stability:                                                                                   F 
USER-DEFINED QUANTITIES 
Material                                                                Mixture 
Scenario                                                                         Catastrophic rupture 
Inventor              160,625,000. kg 
Fixed Duration                                                                                             n/a s 
Stagnation data (data at upstream end for long pipe): 
 -Pressure          bar 
 -Temperature                                                                                     31.06 degC 
 -Fluid State                                                         Liquid at atmospheric pressure  
CALCULATED QUANTITIES  
Mass Flow of Air (Vent from Vapor Space only)         n/a 
Mass Flowrate         kg/s 
Release Duration                        n/a s 
 
Orifice or pipe exit data (before atmospheric expansion): 
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- Pressure                                 n/a bar  
- Temperature                                  n/a degC 
- Vena contracta Velocity (exit velocity for pipe releases)                 n/a m/s 
- Discharge Coefficent           n/a 
Final data  (after atmosheric expansion): 
- Temperature                   31.04 degC 
- Liquid Mass Fraction                                                                1.00 fraction  
- Droplet Diameter                                                                      1E++004 um 
- Expanded Diameter                                                                             n/s  m 
- Velocity                                                                                           7.04 m/s 
DISCHARGE DATA for Weather:  Weather folder\Category 1.5/D 
 Wind Speed:                         1.50m/s 
 Wind Speed at Height (Claculated)                      0.96m/s 
 Pasquill Stability:                                                                                   D 
USER-DEFINED QUANTITIES 
Material                                                                Mixture 
Scenario                                                                         Catastrophic rupture 
Inventor              160,625,000. kg 
Fixed Duration                                                                                             n/a s 
Stagnation data (data at upstream end for long pipe): 
 -Pressure          bar 
 -Temperature                                                                                     31.06 degC 
 -Fluid State                                                         Liquid at atmospheric pressure  
CALCULATED QUANTITIES  
Mass Flow of Air (Vent from Vapor Space only)         n/a 
Mass Flowrate         kg/s 
Release Duration                        n/a s 
Orifice or pipe exit data (before atmospheric expansion): 
- Pressure                                 n/a bar  
- Temperature                                  n/a degC 
- Vena contracta Velocity (exit velocity for pipe releases)                 n/a m/s 
- Discharge Coefficent           n/a 
Final data  (after atmosheric expansion): 
- Temperature                   31.04 degC 
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- Liquid Mass Fraction                                                                1.00 fraction  
- Droplet Diameter                                                                      1E++004 um 
- Expanded Diameter                                                                             n/s  m 
- Velocity                                                                                           7.04 m/s 
DISCHARGE DATA for Weather:  Weather folder\Category 5/D 
 Wind Speed:                        5.00 m/s 
 Wind Speed at Height (Calculated)                     3.21 m/s 
 Pasquill Stability:                                                                                   D 
USER-DEFINED QUANTITIES 
Material                                                                Mixture 
Scenario                                                                         Catastrophic rupture 
Inventor              160,625,000. kg 
Fixed Duration                                                                                             n/a s 
Stagnation data (data at upstream end for long pipe): 
 -Pressure          bar 
 -Temperature                                                                                     31.06 degC 
 -Fluid State                                                         Liquid at atmospheric pressure  
 
 CALCULATED QUANTITIES 
Mass Flow of Air (Vent from Vapor Space only)         n/a 
Mass Flowrate         kg/s 
Release Duration                        n/a s 
Orifice or pipe exit data (before atmospheric expansion): 
- Pressure                                 n/a bar  
- Temperature                                  n/a degC 
- Vena contracta Velocity (exit velocity for pipe releases)                 n/a m/s 
- Discharge Coefficent           n/a 
Final data  (after atmosheric expansion): 
- Temperature                   31.04 degC 
- Liquid Mass Fraction                                                                1.00 fraction  
- Droplet Diameter                                                                      1E++004 um 
- Expanded Diameter                                                                             n/s  m 
- Velocity                                                                                           7.04 m/s 
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11.2.1 Consequence results  
Pool Vaporization Results  
Pool vaporization segments begin when the cloud has left the pool 
 
  
Category 
1.5/F 
Category 
1.5/D 
Category 
 5/D 
Liquid Rainout fraction  0,794149 0,794183 0,794121 
Initial Vapor Cloud kg 2,19489E+07 2,19452E+07 2,19518E+07 
Time Pool Left Behind  s 3640,87 3640,87 1419,9 
 
    
     
 
Figure  11.1 :  Pool vaporization rate vs time (Scenario 1). 
 
   
 
Late Pool Fire Hazard  
  
Category 
1.5/F 
Category 
1.5/D 
Category 
5/D 
Late Pool Fire 
Status  
 
Hazard Hazard Hazard 
 
 
Radiation Effects: Late Pool Fire Ellipse 
    
Distance (m) 
 
   
Category 
1.5/F 
Category 
1.5/D 
Category 
5/D 
Radiation Level 4 Kw/m
2
 2412,22 2286,72 2583,73 
Radiation Level 12,5 Kw/m
2
 1731,77 1613,59 1671,05 
Radiation Level 37,5 Kw/m
2
 Not Reached Not Reached  Not Reached 
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Figure  11.2 : Radiation and distance for late pool fire (Scenario 1). 
 
 
Figure  11.3 : Intensity radii for late pool fire (Scenario 1). 
 
Flash Fire Envelope 
    
Distance (m) 
 
   
Category 1.5/F 
Category 
1.5/D Category 5/D 
Furthest 
Extent  
   
3485,9 ppm 14341,7 13679 6803,7 
Furthest 
Extent  6971,8 ppm 11751,6 10985,2 5009,73 
    
 
Heights (m) for above distances 
   
Category 1.5/F 
Category 
1.5/D Category 5/D 
Furthest 
Extent  3485,9 ppm 0 0 0 
Furthest 
Extent  6971,8 ppm 0 0 0 
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Figure  11.4 : Flash fire envelope (Scenario 1). 
11.3 Scenario 2 - Phast User Defined Data  
Scenario 
 Direction  
  [Outdoor release direction                                                    Horizontal] 
 Hole  
  Orifice diameter                                                                        11.2 mm 
  Use specified discharge coefficient ?                                          No 
 Release Location 
  Tank Head                 17 m 
  [Elevation                 1   m] 
Material 
 Material 
  [Material characteristic                   Flammable only] 
  [Material to track                      Mixture] 
Discharge parameters  
 Droplet breakup mechnism  
  [Droplet break-up mechanism-instantaneous  Use flashing correlation] 
  [Droplet break-up mechanism-continuous      Do not force correlation] 
 Model seetings  
  [Atmospheric expansion method                    Closest initial conditions] 
  [Is flashing allowed to the orifice ?               No flashing in the orifice] 
Dipersion 
 Dispersion scope 
  [Specify user-defined averaging time                                               No] 
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Bund, building and terrain: Default terrain  
 Dispersing surface 
  [Surface over which the dispersion occurs                                    Land] 
  [Surface roughness length                                              User-defined] 
  [User-defined length                                                          183.156 mm] 
Bund, building and terrain 
 Building definition 
  [Specify a release building       No] 
  [Building wake effect                                                                    None] 
Flammable  
 Ignition and explosion  
  [Supply late igniton location                                   No igniton location] 
  [Explosion methot                                                                          TNT] 
 Jet fire method  
  [Jet fire method                                                                   Cone model] 
Explosion prameters 
 TNT parameters  
  [Air or ground burst                                                                 Air burst] 
  [Default TNT explosion efficiency                                      0.1 fraction] 
 Vapour liquid method  
  [Use of exlosion mass modification factor      Early and late explosion] 
  [Explosion mass modification factor                                                   3] 
Jet fire  
 Cone model data 
  [Horizontal options                                               Use standard method] 
  [Correlation                                                               DNV recommend] 
 Parameters  
  [Rate modification factor                                                                     3] 
 Radiation levels 
  [Number of input radiation levels         3] 
  [Intensity levels (1)                                                                  4 kW/m
2
] 
  [Intensity levels (2)                                                             12.5 kW/m
2
] 
  [Intensity levels (3)                                                             37.5 kW/m
2
] 
 Surface emissive power  
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  [Calculation method for surface emissive power            Calculate SEP] 
   
 Parameters 
  [Radiative fraction for general fires                                     0.4 fraction] 
 Radiation levels 
  [Number of input radiation levels         3] 
  [Intensity levels (1)                                                                  4 kW/m
2
] 
  [Intensity levels (2)                                                             12.5 kW/m
2
] 
  [Intensity levels (3)                                                             37.5 kW/m
2
] 
 
DISCHARGE DATA for Weather:  Weather folder\Category 1.5/F 
  
 Wind Speed:                         1.50m/s 
 Wind Speed at Height (Claculated)                      0.46m/s 
 Pasquill Stability:                                                                                   F 
USER-DEFINED QUANTITIES 
Material                                                                Mixture 
Scenario                                                                                                  Leak 
Inventor              160,625,000. kg 
Fixed Duration                                                                                             n/a s 
 
Stagnation data (data at upstream end for long pipe): 
 -Pressure          bar 
 -Temperature                                                                                     31.06 degC 
 -Fluid State                                                         Liquid at atmospheric pressure  
 
 CALCULATED QUANTITIES  
 
Mass Flow of Air (Vent from Vapor Space only)          n/a 
Mass Flowrate                        0,894049  kg/s 
Release Duration                     3,600.00      s 
 
Orifice or pipe exit data (before atmospheric expansion): 
- Pressure                            1.01   bar  
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- Temperature                              31.03 degC 
- Vena contracta Velocity (exit velocity for pipe releases)            20.82  m/s 
- Discharge Coefficent                    0.60 
 
Final data  (after atmosheric expansion): 
- Temperature                   31.04 degC 
- Liquid Mass Fraction                                                                1.00 fraction  
- Droplet Diameter                                                           4.7361E+002    um 
- Expanded Radius                                                                            0.0      m 
- Velocity                                                                                         20.82 m/s 
m/s 
 
DISCHARGE DATA for Weather:  Wether folder\Category 1.5/D 
 Wind Speed:                         1.50m/s 
 Wind Speed at Height (Claculated)                      0.96m/s 
 Pasquill Stability:                                                                                   D 
 
USER-DEFINED QUANTITIES 
  
Material                                                                Mixture 
Scenario                                                                         Catastrophic rupture 
Inventor              160,625,000. kg 
Fixed Duration                                                                                             n/a s 
 
Stagnation data (data at upstream end for long pipe): 
 -Pressure          bar 
 -Temperature                                                                                     31.06 degC 
 -Fluid State                                                         Liquid at atmospheric pressure  
 
CALCULATED QUANTITIES  
 
Mass Flow of Air (Vent from Vapor Space only)         n/a 
Mass Flowrate                        0.894049  kg/s 
Release Duration                   3,600.00       s 
 
76 
 
Orifice or pipe exit data (before atmospheric expansion): 
- Pressure                               1.01     bar  
- Temperature                             31.03  degC 
- Vena contracta Velocity (exit velocity for pipe releases)          20.82    m/s 
- Discharge Coefficent        0.60 
 
Final data  (after atmosheric expansion): 
- Temperature                   31.04 degC 
- Liquid Mass Fraction                                                                1.00 fraction  
- Droplet Diameter                                                            4.7361E+002    um 
- Expanded Diameter                                                                      0.0        m 
- Velocity                                                                                      20.82    m/s 
 
DISCHARGE DATA for Weather:  Wether folder\Category 5/D 
  
 Wind Speed:                        5.00 m/s 
 Wind Speed at Height (Claculated)                     3.21 m/s 
 Pasquill Stability:                                                                                   D 
 
USER-DEFINED QUANTITIES 
  
Material                                                                Mixture 
Scenario                                                                         Catastrophic rupture 
Inventor              160,625,000. kg 
Fixed Duration                                                                                             n/a s 
 
Stagnation data (data at upstream end for long pipe): 
 -Pressure          bar 
 -Temperature                                                                                     31.06 degC 
 -Fluid State                                                         Liquid at atmospheric pressure  
 
 CALCULATED QUANTITIES  
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Mass Flow of Air (Vent from Vapor Space only)         n/a 
Mass Flowrate                                           0.894049     kg/s 
Release Duration                      3,600.00        s 
 
Orifice or pipe exit data (before atmospheric expansion): 
- Pressure                          1.01      bar  
- Temperature                           31.03    degC 
- Vena contracta Velocity (exit velocity for pipe releases)        20.82      m/s 
- Discharge Coefficent                  0.60 
 
Final data  (after atmosheric expansion): 
- Temperature                31.03            degC 
- Liquid Mass Fraction                                                     1.00            fraction  
- Droplet Diameter                                                           4.7261E+002     um 
- Expanded Diameter                                                        0.0                       m 
- Velocity                                                                          20.82                m/s 
 
11.3.1 Consequence results  
 
Figure  11.5 : Pool vaporization results (Scenario 2). 
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Figure  11.6 : Pool vaporization rate vs time (Scenario 2). 
 
 
Jet Fire Hazard 
Jet fire method used: Cone model – DNV recommended 
 
Figure  11.7 : Radiation effects for jet fire ellipse (Scenario 2). 
 
 
 
Figure  11.8 : Radiation vs distance for jet fire (Scenario 2). 
Early Pool Fire Hazard and Radiation Effects Early Pool Fire  Ellipse 
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Figure  11.9 : Radiation effects for early pool fire ellipse (Scenario 2). 
 
 
 
Figure  11.10 :  Radiation vs distance for early pool fire (Scenario 2). 
 
Late Pool Fire Hazard and Radiation Effects Late Pool Fire Ellipse 
 
 
Figure  11.11 : Radiation effects for late pool fire ellipse (Scenario 2). 
 
 
Figure  11.12 : Radiation vs distance for late pool fire (Scenario 2). 
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Flash Fire Envelope  
All flammable results are reported at the cloud centreline height  
 
 
Figure  11.13 : Flash fire envelope (Scenario 2). 
 
11.4 Scenario 3. Phast User Defined Data 
Scenario 
 Release Location 
  Tank Head                   5 m 
  [Elevation                 3   m] 
Material 
 Material 
  [Material characteristic          Flammable only] 
  [Material to track              Mixture] 
Discharge parameters  
 Droplet breakup mechanism  
  [Droplet break-up mechanism-instantaneous  Use flashing correlation] 
Dispersion 
 Dispersion scope 
  [Specify user-defined averaging time                                               No] 
Bund, building and terrain: Default terrain  
 Dispersing surface 
  [Surface over which the dispersion occurs                                    Land] 
  [Surface roughness length                                              User-defined] 
  [User-defined length                                                          183.156 mm] 
Bund, building and terrain: No bund  
 Bund Properties  
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  [Bund Height                            0   m] 
  [Building area                                                                                 0 m
2
] 
  [Bund failure modeling                                    Bund cannot fail] 
 Surface for pools  
  [Type of surface for pools                                            Concrete] 
Bund, building and terrain  
 Building definition 
  [Specify a release building                                                     No] 
  [Building wake effect                                                         None] 
Flammable  
 Fireball emissive power  
  Use vessel burst pressure       No 
 Ignition and explosion  
  [Supply late igniton location                                   No igniton location] 
  [Explosion methot                                                                          TNT] 
Explosion prameters 
 TNT parameters  
  [Air or ground burst                                                                 Air burst] 
  [Default TNT explosion efficiency                                      0.1 fraction] 
 Vapour liquid method  
  [Use of exlosion mass modification factor      Early and late explosion] 
  [Explosion mass modification factor                                                   3] 
Fireball 
 Calculation method  
  [Fireball model                                                      DNV recommended] 
 Parameters 
  [Mass modification factor                                                                    3] 
 Radiation levels 
  [Number of input radiation levels         3] 
  [Intensity levels (1)                                                                  4 kW/m
2
] 
  [Intensity levels (2)                                                             12.5 kW/m
2
] 
  [Intensity levels (3)                                                             37.5 kW/m
2
] 
Pool fire  
 Parameters 
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  [Radiative fraction for general fires                                     0.4 fraction] 
 Radiation levels 
  [Number of input radiation levels         3] 
  [Intensity levels (1)                                                                  4 kW/m
2
] 
  [Intensity levels (2)                                                             12.5 kW/m
2
] 
  [Intensity levels (3)                                                             37.5 kW/m
2
] 
DISCHARGE DATA for Weather:  Weather folder\Category 1.5/F 
 Wind Speed:                         1.50m/s 
 Wind Speed at Height (Claculated)                      0.81m/s 
 Pasquill Stability:                                                                                   F 
USER-DEFINED QUANTITIES 
Material                                                                Mixture 
Scenario                                                                         Catastrophic rupture 
Inventor              200,000,00. kg 
Fixed Duration                                                                                             n/a s 
Stagnation data (data at upstream end for long pipe): 
 -Pressure         19.01 bar 
 -Temperature                                                                                     25.00 degC 
 -Fluid State                                                                         Non-saturated liquid 
CALCULATED QUANTITIES  
Mass Flow of Air (Vent from Vapor Space only)         n/a 
Mass Flowrate         kg/s 
Release Duration                        n/a s 
Orifice or pipe exit data (before atmospheric expansion): 
- Pressure                                 n/a bar  
- Temperature                                  n/a degC 
- Vena contracta Velocity (exit velocity for pipe releases)                 n/a m/s 
- Discharge Coefficent           n/a 
Final data  (after atmosheric expansion): 
- Temperature                   24.69 degC 
- Liquid Mass Fraction                                                                1.00 fraction  
- Droplet Diameter                                                            2.59847E+002 um 
- Expanded Radius                                                                             n/a  m 
- Velocity                                                                                        38.79 m/s 
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DISCHARGE DATA for Weather:  Wether folder\Category 1.5/D 
 Wind Speed:                         1.50m/s 
 Wind Speed at Height (Claculated)                      1.19m/s 
 Pasquill Stability:                                                                                   D 
USER-DEFINED QUANTITIES 
Material                                                                Mixture 
Scenario                                                                         Catastrophic rupture 
Inventor              200,000,00. kg 
Fixed Duration                                                                                             n/a s 
 
Stagnation data (data at upstream end for long pipe): 
 -Pressure         19.01 bar 
 -Temperature                                                                                     25.00 degC 
 -Fluid State                                                         Non-saturated liquid  
CALCULATED QUANTITIES  
Mass Flow of Air (Vent from Vapor Space only)         n/a 
Mass Flowrate         kg/s 
Release Duration                        n/a s 
Orifice or pipe exit data (before atmospheric expansion): 
- Pressure                                 n/a bar  
- Temperature                                  n/a degC 
- Vena contracta Velocity (exit velocity for pipe releases)                 n/a m/s 
- Discharge Coefficent           n/a 
Final data  (after atmosheric expansion): 
- Temperature                   24.69 degC 
- Liquid Mass Fraction                                                                1.00 fraction  
- Droplet Diameter                                                            2.59847E+002 um 
- Expanded Radius                                                                             n/a  m 
- Velocity                                                                                         38.79 m/s 
DISCHARGE DATA for Weather:  Wether folder\Category 5/D 
 Wind Speed:                        5.00 m/s 
 Wind Speed at Height (Claculated)                     3.96 m/s 
 Pasquill Stability:                                                                                   D 
USER-DEFINED QUANTITIES 
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Material                                                                Mixture 
Scenario                                                                         Catastrophic rupture 
Inventor              200,000,00. kg 
Fixed Duration                                                                                             n/a s 
Stagnation data (data at upstream end for long pipe): 
 -Pressure         19.01 bar 
 -Temperature                                                                                     25.00 degC 
 -Fluid State                                                                         Non-saturated liquid  
CALCULATED QUANTITIES  
Mass Flow of Air (Vent from Vapor Space only)         n/a 
Mass Flowrate         kg/s 
Release Duration                        n/a s 
Orifice or pipe exit data (before atmospheric expansion): 
- Pressure                                 n/a bar  
- Temperature                                  n/a degC 
- Vena contracta Velocity (exit velocity for pipe releases)                 n/a m/s 
- Discharge Coefficent           n/a 
Final data  (after atmosheric expansion): 
- Temperature                   24.69 degC 
- Liquid Mass Fraction                                                                1.00 fraction  
- Droplet Diameter                                                            2.59847E+002 um 
- Expanded Diameter                                                                             n/s  m 
- Velocity                                                                                        38.79 m/s 
 
11.4.1 Consequence results  
Distance to Concentration Results 
The height for user defined concentrations is the user defined height 0 m. All toxic 
results are reported at the toxic effect height 0 m. All flammable results are reported 
at the cloud centreline height. 
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Figure  11.14 : Distance to concentration results (Scenario 3). 
 
 
Figure  11.15 : Cloud footprint (Scenario 3). 
 
Figure  11.16 : Side view (Scenario 3). 
 
Figure  11.17 : Cross section (Scenario 3). 
 
Flash Fire Envelope 
 
All flammable results are reported at the cloud centreline height. 
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Figure  11.18 : Flash fire envelope (Scenario 3). 
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12. CONCLUSION 
After analyse  the scenarios and graphics, manager  of plant should follow-up below 
schedules : 
 
 Prepare Emergency Management Plans 
 Provide Training Course to Emergency Team For These Plans 
 Make Practices and Minimize Damage,  If these accidents will happen 
 Determination of Safety Distances 
 Damage Assessment 
By these ways, effective interventions aimed to possible accidents. 
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